Epistemic Injustice Is Misapplied to Psychiatry

Some of the greatest minds in psychiatry have emphasized the importance of philosophy in the field and done some excellent work in that area. Unfortunately philosophy can also be used to attack the field and when it is, some of that work is not very well done. Since I’ve been writing this blog there have been a couple of examples. The first was the argument that the DSM-5 was a “blueprint for living”. My counterargument is available at this link and you can read the subsequent dialogue. It should be evident from my argument that the DSM-5 is the farthest thing from the blueprint for living that a psychiatrist could imagine. The political context for that article in the New York Times was the supposed controversy about the DSM-5. It was being portrayed in the media as almost apocalyptic and this opinion piece fit right in.  I always viewed the DSM-5 as the non-event that it proved to be.

The second couple of articles focused on critical psychiatry. One was an opinion piece about critical psychiatry and the second was a summary of critical psychiatry written by a couple of critical psychiatrists. In the philosophy literature as it applies to psychiatry there is always a lot of hedging around the issue of whether philosophical critics are anti-psychiatrists or something else. Some authors for example refer to them as skeptics. I have no problem with the school that sees them as anti-psychiatrists and made the argument that if critical psychiatrists based their criticism on antipsychiatry philosophers they are in fact anti-psychiatrists.

The latest philosophical criticism of psychiatry is an opinion piece (1) called “Epistemic injustice in psychiatry.” It is written by an author who has a doctorate in philosophy and is a psychiatrist and two academic philosophers. Their main thesis is that epistemic injustice occurs to a number of people based on biases against them and this prejudice undermines their credibility in that context.  In the case of medical treatment, that means the patient is not taken seriously and their treatment plan would be more unilateral on the part of the provider rather than collaborative and seriously considering their input. But I don’t want to minimize the authors definition and so I am including it at this point below:

“Epistemic injustice is harm done to a person in her capacity as an epistemic subject (a knower, a reasoner, a questioner) by undermining her capacity to engage in epistemic practices such as giving knowledge to others (testifying) or making sense of one’s experience (interpreting). It typically arises when a hearer does not take the statements of the speaker as seriously as they deserve to be taken.”

They cite racism and sexism as good examples where prejudical stereotypes lead to the subjects information being discounted. They build on this idea and suggest that people with mental illness are subjected to similar biases. From there they extrapolate and say that physicians and psychiatrists in particular make these same biased assessments and discount what patients say to them. They acknowledge that there are some circumstances where the credibility the patient may be questioned. They also suggest that this epistemic injustice is more likely to happen with psychiatric patients than other patients with physical illnesses. They suggest this has a detrimental effect on psychiatric patients, funding psychiatric services, and public perception.

They describe three examples of “epistemic injustice in psychiatry”. In all three cases the patients were put on acute psychiatric holds. In the first case a man claimed to be related to a Soviet leader and that was seen as delusional when it was true. In the second case a woman had cultural beliefs and practices that were misinterpreted as delusions. In the third case the patient had chronic suicidal thinking and visited the same cliff numerous times. He was admitted on hold when he was at the cliff for an hour and the decision was eventually made to treat him as a chronic high-risk patient on a voluntary basis. In all three cases the patients were released from the hospital by the civil commitment authority.

There are several problems with these vignettes and the inferences. The first is that the patients are being held on legal basis and not because of a psychiatric diagnosis. At least that is what happens in the United States. In other words, people cannot be held on the basis of a diagnosis they also have to present an imminent danger to themselves or others. It is a contested legal process and that in itself blurs the diagnosis and inhibits communication. The vignettes also seem to say that people are never adequately assessed based on their history and released even before the legal hold is released. As an acute care psychiatrist I have had to assess and release thousands of people when we determined that the history they gave us was accurate. In other words we believed them and released them. Of all the people I assessed and treated I am not aware of anyone who was released by a court because I made in an inaccurate assessment by not listening to the patient.

The authors move on to talk about contributory factors for epistemic injustice.  They discuss a number of archaic stereotypes (for a psychiatrist) of people with mental illness such as believing substance use users have a “lack of willpower” and that they are responsible for their own particular problems. I have never really met a psychiatrist with these beliefs and doubt that people with those beliefs go into psychiatry. I have certainly met other medical specialists with these beliefs and in fact argue with them regularly about that. The authors do have a rare point when they point out that negative stereotypes and stigma lead voters and politicians to underfund treatment for mental illness but that has nothing to do with the way psychiatrists communicate with their patients.

They discuss the topic of hard versus soft evidence. They use this to develop the argument that health professionals have epistemic power because “only they have access to this evidence and have the training to interpret it”. They really stretch to come up with the statement that some psychiatrists think of their patients as "objects of epistemic inquiry" rather than collaborators. I wonder if the authors are familiar with the psychiatric concept of therapeutic alliance. In the therapeutic alliance the psychiatrist and the patient are active collaborators and both the psychiatrist and the patient focus on solving problems that the patient identifies. That is an active process that as far as I know is taught to all psychiatrists. It wouldn’t work if a psychiatrist was looking at the patient as an object of inquiry.

The third contributor to epistemic injustice is negative stereotypes. The common stereotype mentioned by the authors is that “people with a mental illness are responsible for their condition”. I don’t think any psychiatrists think this way but at the end of this section the authors go back to making an argument about how psychiatric services are inadequately funded because the public and politicians maintain these negative stereotypes. So in the end two of the three contributory factors have more to do with the public’s lack of knowledge about psychiatric disorders than how psychiatrists function.

They discuss dementia and schizophrenia as conditions where the patient’s input may be minimized because of cognitive factors or their psychiatric status. The main stereotypes mentioned are the dangerousness stereotype with schizophrenia and the hopeless case stereotype with dementia. It is very difficult to understand how either of these descriptions support their main argument. Psychiatrists are trained to weigh what the patient is telling them and whether or not it might be plausible. Compared to practically all people - psychiatrists should have the best framework for what might or might not be plausible in the area of human behavior.  I can recall being interrupted during team meetings with news that one of my patients had communicated some behavior that the staff in the room were discounting as implausible and I suppose that is congruent with the authors’ argument. Those behaviors range from self reports of severe self endangering behavior to behaviors with a high likelihood of aggression. In most cases I considered the patient report to be accurate.  I had no doubt that a very low frequency behavior had occurred based on that patient’s history and in those cases it was generally corroborated.

The authors do not elaborate on the case where the patient's statements are uncritically accepted by the treating physician.  That is a likely cause of overprescribing and unnecessary testing.   

The entire first section of the paper does not seem to reflect modern psychiatric practice. I just put up a post on about 50 different factors that can be discussed with the patient at the end of the interview and a few real life examples of what is discussed. All treatment planning is based on what the patient says in that interview. The authors examples are cases where psychiatry and psychiatric assessment is secondary to legal considerations and all the impaired communication that involves. So there appears to be no epistemic injustice at the level of psychiatrist talking to patients in an outpatient setting.  The only exception would be a psychiatrist with insufficient expertise or one under severe constraints.  Those constraints can include a lack of time with the patient and unrealistic productivity and paperwork demands by the bureaucracy. 

The authors move on to discuss ways to overcome epistemic injustice. They suggest changing training to emphasize the subjective perspective of patients. I don’t understand that argument because the psychiatric evaluation should be focused entirely on the subjective perspective of patients. If the psychiatrist has any technical expertise at all, empathy is used to communicate that the psychiatrist knows what the patient is going through. The best description of empathy comes from British psychiatry as follows:

“Empathy is achieved by precise, insightful, persistent and knowledgeable questioning until the doctor is able to give an account of the patient’s subjective experience that the patient recognizes as his own.” (2)

That hardly seems like an exercise in disbelieving or ignoring what the patient has to say. Further psychiatric assessment should be focused on the entire conscious state of the patient rather than just what they have to say. Psychiatrists should be adept at diagnosing and treating patients who are unconscious and comatose, delirious, cognitively impaired, and experiencing severe psychiatric symptoms. A psychiatric assessment is more than believing what is said. I have frequently been in the position of having to explain to the patient what was happening to them and helping them make sense of their current experience. That is a singular focus on the patient’s subjective state when they are confused and unable to describe it.

The authors suggest multidisciplinary teams with a focus on the emotional aspects of care. I don’t know if that happens in England but in the United States I had team meetings every day for 22 years. The emotional aspect of care including interpersonal dynamics with patients and among the staff was routinely discussed in those meetings.

The authors suggest that medical students should be “taught to believe what psychiatric patients tell them unless there is a good reason not to do so”. My hope would be that medical students are able to see how attending physicians approach evaluations and treat psychiatric patients much differently than other physicians. The main factors that lead to that different approach include therapeutic neutrality, a lack of bias toward people with severe psychiatric disorders and addictions, and an ability to talk to all people with those problems. There is a more technical point that might not be as evident and that is psychiatrists are the only physicians who are systematically trained to understand and analyze their reactions to the patient and what that might mean. That is what psychiatrists do and why they are consulted by other physicians and by everyone else when problems are significant.

A much better approach is to go after institutional countertransference or the collective emotional and interpersonal reactions that can be seen institution wide based on psychiatric and addiction diagnoses. This is the single most important factor in being able to provide quality care to people with these conditions. A negative institutional countertransference toward these patients is evident in most hospitals and clinics where I have worked.  Only one person - the director of an emergency medicine program was interested in addressing it and had me speak as a consultant at a Grand Rounds on the subject. These negative attitudes are driven to an extent by stereotypes but also by the neglectful way society and political systems treat these people. They have been cast as a burden on the medical system, always uncooperative, people who deserve minimal if any treatment, and their treatment resources are cut to the bone. Psychiatrists working in these settings and promoting a model of therapeutic neutrality facilitating appropriate care is one of the best solutions - but more cooperation outside of the psychiatric community is needed.

In summary, epistemic injustice appears to be another philosophical concept that is misapplied to psychiatry.   There is no doubt that people can be misdiagnosed. There is no doubt that things don’t always go well. There is a clear reason for that and that is everyone coming to see a psychiatrist has a unique conscious state. There is no catalog of every unique conscious state. The psychiatrist's job is to understand that unique conscious state and it happens through direct communication with that person.  That direct communication can happen only if the psychiatrist is an unbiased listener.

George Dawson, MD, DFAPA

References:


1: Crichton P, Carel H, Kidd IJ. Epistemic injustice in psychiatry. BJPsych Bull.  2017 Apr;41(2):65-70. doi: 10.1192/pb.bp.115.050682. PubMed PMID: 28400962;

2: Sims A. Symptoms in the Mind. Elsevier Limited; London; 2003; p 3.


Graphic Credit:

The above photo was downloaded from Shutterstock per their standard user agreement.  The title is
Joshua Trees in Mojave Desert, California by Dean Stanisavljevic.