Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz came out with a recent commentary of the economic recovery and why things are not a rosy as they seem. He points out that many of the structural problems with the economy including predatory lending and credit, abuses by the credit card industry and abuses by the credit reporting industry are still in place. In addition there are inadequate capital reserves and no real limits on the kind of low risk speculation by certain parts of the financial services industry - the basic problem that started everything 5 years ago. I have been posting in political forums for the past 15 years that the American economy at times seems to be based on a fantasy rather than the way a real economy should work.
We have taken an alleged retirement system (401K, 403B) and turned it into a windfall for the financial services industry. Instead of an actual retirement system, we find that the average American is not able to put away nearly enough to retire and in the process ends up paying significant fees to financial services companies. In return for these fees they receive the standard boilerplate about no guarantee against losses and frequently have very poor investment choices since they are determined by their employer. At the same time, low risk retirement vehicles like money market funds are paying negligible amount of interest. Rather than being a reliable retirement system this is essentially another tax on the American people to fund the financial services industry. Retirees are left with the option of accumulating cash only or putting their retirement funds at significant risk all of the time in order to accumulate enough capital to retire.
We are in the process of starting a huge health care mandate know as the PPACA or more popularly as Obamacare. It will create a large influx of capital into the healthcare system based on coverage mandates. The American health care system is currently the most expensive system of health care in the world. The standard model used by the federal and state government has been to use managed care companies as intermediaries to contain costs. There should be no doubt that model is a near total failure. Recent data for example suggest that a couple nearing retirement should have an additional quarter of a million dollars saved for health care expenses during retirement beyond the cost of Medicare. The health care system in this country can be viewed as a second tax on the American people.
How do Americans end up with two additional taxes being levied on them in addition to the usual income, Medicare, Social Security, sales, and property taxes? How does it happen when we have a supposed radical element of one of the major parties working on fiscal responsibility? I think it comes down to one American institution and that is the US Senate. The Senate is full of aging, wealthy politicians who have worked for years to develop a power base in Washington and keep it. They are completely out of touch with what the American people need and pass laws that will largely benefit the businesses that they are heavily lobbied by. In some cases, they wrote the laws to invent the industry. The disconnect of this group from the public was evident during the recent stand off to shut down the government and nearly default on our creditors. In other words they risked the world economy to make a point instead of fairly representing what the average American wanted at that time.
How does all of this apply to the politics of psychiatry? I can illustrate by looking at a few seminal events that apply to all front line psychiatrists and how their professional organization - the American Psychiatric Association (APA) responded:
1. Managed care and the disproportionate rationing of psychiatric services: Apart from Harold Eist, MD and a recent lawsuit against a managed care company there has generally been silence on this issue. Some literature was generated regarding how to work with meager rationed resources but nothing about how to fight back as managed care became a government institution. The APA's support of collaborative care means we have come full circle and the APA is explicitly backing a managed care model that involves treating patients without actually seeing them.
2. The response to accusations of conflicts of interest related to the pharmaceutical industry: There was a well known initiative against some prominent psychiatrists, the motivations for that initiative are still unknown. It is well known that many academics in many university departments have contracting arrangements with industries in order to supplement their salaries. It is well know that some professions charged with determining industry standards insist on industry representation in meetings where those standards are written. It is known that many professional organizations got more support from the pharmaceutical industry than the APA. The response to the attack from a Senator was to basically acknowledge that his attack was accurate and proceed with an appeasement approach that allowed critics of psychiatry to use this as additional rhetoric against the profession and any psychiatrist with a contracting arrangement.
3. The Maintenance of Certification (MOC) issue: This issue was forced by the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) based on limited research. The APA immediately aligned themselves with the ABMS despite considerable complaints and a petition by the membership.
The three examples given about are some of the main political issues for psychiatry, particularly the average working psychiatrist and the APA. To say that the interests of most psychiatrists are not represented by the APA is a massive understatement. Like the U.S. Senate, the APA seems almost totally disconnected from the people it is there to represent. I have heard many reasons over the years about how the actual structure of the APA is the problem. But nobody seems to want to remedy that problem. I attended a seminar at one point where an APA official explained the MOC issue and how it would actually create a financial burden for the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABNP), despite the obvious fee generation to take a commercially monitored and administered test. If it really is that burdensome - why do it in the first place? The initial rationale was that the public demanded it. It seems that there is now solicitation for public support. Who would not support an initiative to improve the competency of doctors - even if there is absolutely no evidence that a multiple choice exam with a high pass rate does that?
I think it is highly likely that the political structure of the APA is very similar to the political structure of the Senate. While there is no lobbying there are ideas and affiliations based on those ideas. Any political structure that is so far removed from what its constituents want it driven by cluelessness, conflicts of interest, or a divine mandate. It is only logical to conclude that like the Senate, the issue is conflicts of interest. In the 21st century, patriotism is no longer the last refuge of a scoundrel - accountability is. The APA would do well not to follow the Senate on that course.
George Dawson, MD, DFAPA
Joseph Stiglitz. 5 Years In Limbo. Project Syndicate, October 27, 2013.
Showing posts with label accountable care organization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label accountable care organization. Show all posts
Sunday, October 27, 2013
Tuesday, June 25, 2013
The Real Problem With Managed Care Research
You know the kind of research I am talking about. The research that shows that managed care is more cost effective and higher quality than fee for service. This stuff has been out there since the 1990s. Is there really research like that out there or is it little more than a political exercise? We have more than a few clues thanks to recent analysis of a Health Affairs article by Kip Sullivan. The article is titled: "The ‘Alternative Quality Contract,’ Based On A Global Budget, Lowered Medical Spending And Improved Quality" Sullivan points out that the title of this article is misleading because it suggests that the managed care intervention here "lowered medical spending and improved quality" in the title, but in the body of the work the authors state:
"Our findings do not imply that overall spending fell for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts in 2009-2010."
and a paragraph later:
"This result makes it likely that total Blue Cross Blue Shield payments to groups in 2010 exceeded medical savings achieved by the group that year."
Sullivan's analysis here is dead-on, especially the idea that "medical savings" can be parsed from overall savings when there is suddenly a large managed care infrastructure. From some of the places where I have worked, this means bringing in a raft of middle managers who provide no service and generate no income to "manage' the people who are actually providing the care. In some settings that could mean a "manager" for every 5 - 10 physicians. If your goal is to cut reimbursement to the providers by just paying them less or sending them fewer referrals while adding a costly overhead of a number of managers who think they can translate their ideas about business into better clinical care - that seems like a recipe for higher costs, record physician dissatisfaction, and disregard for professional quality based guidelines. Sullivan points out that this specific problem in managed care research has been around since the 1990's
The "higher quality" issue is as interesting. I encourage anyone interested to download the paper because it is only free until Sunday June 30. As you read it, take a look at the table labeled "Exhibit 4". It is a table of quality care measures across both the control groups and the intervention groups. Although many of the variables are easily defined a couple of issues appear to be clear. Many seem to be process variables. In other words, just keeping track of variables and making sure that you are ticking them off gives you more credit. This is standard procedure in a managed care environment with more case managers. They can literally be assigned to remind physicians or ward teams to do tasks on a time frame that gives them credit for the process variable. More administrative manpower should equate to a larger percentage of process variables.
I note that within the quality variables there are two that apply to psychiatry - Depression: Short Term Rx and Depression: Long Term Rx. There are no significant differences across that study period at the P<0.05 level. This is interesting at a couple of levels. First, if this is actually the number of depressed people treated the change after the managed care intervention is not significant. Secondly, what measures are used to make this determination. Are these actually depressed people or are they patients scoring above a certain cutoff on a PHQ-9 rating scale? Third, is the change in percentage of patients treated a legitimate quality marker? Aren't we more interested in retention in treatment and actual treatment of individual patients treated into remission rather than a cross sectional look at the percentage of patients treated?
The scientific concerns about this paper are numerous. Like all research (and I mean all research) there are political implications. The defined intervention here of the Alternate Quality Contract, is basically a primary care physician as gatekeeper model that consumers rejected over a decade ago. At that point in time, managed care organizations realized that they would need to compete on the basis of providing direct access to specialty care without primary care referrals. The adaption of the MCOs was to hire their own specialists and build speciality clinics. The article describes this as basically the "patient centered medical home" (p 1886). I wonder if the average consumer realizes that the medical home is really a primary care gatekeeper system from the past?
I can't help stressing the importance of article like this one and all research that purports to save money with larger administrative structures that are there in a large part to supervise physicians rather than create administrative efficiencies. There is no better example than the non-existent mental health system for what this kind of rationing and administrative excess can create. Diverting money from the direct provision of clinical care into complicated forms of administrative overhead needs to be measured accurately in all of these studies.
George Dawson, MD, DFAPA
"Our findings do not imply that overall spending fell for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts in 2009-2010."
and a paragraph later:
"This result makes it likely that total Blue Cross Blue Shield payments to groups in 2010 exceeded medical savings achieved by the group that year."
Sullivan's analysis here is dead-on, especially the idea that "medical savings" can be parsed from overall savings when there is suddenly a large managed care infrastructure. From some of the places where I have worked, this means bringing in a raft of middle managers who provide no service and generate no income to "manage' the people who are actually providing the care. In some settings that could mean a "manager" for every 5 - 10 physicians. If your goal is to cut reimbursement to the providers by just paying them less or sending them fewer referrals while adding a costly overhead of a number of managers who think they can translate their ideas about business into better clinical care - that seems like a recipe for higher costs, record physician dissatisfaction, and disregard for professional quality based guidelines. Sullivan points out that this specific problem in managed care research has been around since the 1990's
The "higher quality" issue is as interesting. I encourage anyone interested to download the paper because it is only free until Sunday June 30. As you read it, take a look at the table labeled "Exhibit 4". It is a table of quality care measures across both the control groups and the intervention groups. Although many of the variables are easily defined a couple of issues appear to be clear. Many seem to be process variables. In other words, just keeping track of variables and making sure that you are ticking them off gives you more credit. This is standard procedure in a managed care environment with more case managers. They can literally be assigned to remind physicians or ward teams to do tasks on a time frame that gives them credit for the process variable. More administrative manpower should equate to a larger percentage of process variables.
I note that within the quality variables there are two that apply to psychiatry - Depression: Short Term Rx and Depression: Long Term Rx. There are no significant differences across that study period at the P<0.05 level. This is interesting at a couple of levels. First, if this is actually the number of depressed people treated the change after the managed care intervention is not significant. Secondly, what measures are used to make this determination. Are these actually depressed people or are they patients scoring above a certain cutoff on a PHQ-9 rating scale? Third, is the change in percentage of patients treated a legitimate quality marker? Aren't we more interested in retention in treatment and actual treatment of individual patients treated into remission rather than a cross sectional look at the percentage of patients treated?
The scientific concerns about this paper are numerous. Like all research (and I mean all research) there are political implications. The defined intervention here of the Alternate Quality Contract, is basically a primary care physician as gatekeeper model that consumers rejected over a decade ago. At that point in time, managed care organizations realized that they would need to compete on the basis of providing direct access to specialty care without primary care referrals. The adaption of the MCOs was to hire their own specialists and build speciality clinics. The article describes this as basically the "patient centered medical home" (p 1886). I wonder if the average consumer realizes that the medical home is really a primary care gatekeeper system from the past?
I can't help stressing the importance of article like this one and all research that purports to save money with larger administrative structures that are there in a large part to supervise physicians rather than create administrative efficiencies. There is no better example than the non-existent mental health system for what this kind of rationing and administrative excess can create. Diverting money from the direct provision of clinical care into complicated forms of administrative overhead needs to be measured accurately in all of these studies.
George Dawson, MD, DFAPA
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