Showing posts with label phenomenology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label phenomenology. Show all posts

Sunday, June 14, 2020

Depression Prevalence and Other Checklist Limits




I finished reading a paper last night about estimating the prevalence of depression using the PHQ-9 (1). The paper had 76 authors including one of the most well recognized epidemiologists in the world. It was focused on the differences in estimating depression prevalence using a structured research interview specifically the SCID (Structured Clinical Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders versus the PHQ-9 - a nine item checklist based on the DSM criteria for major depression. If you ever need a reference paper for how to write an epidemiology paper based on a literature search this is probably a good one to have.

The authors did an extensive literature review in the end found 44 (n=9,242) studies that looked at comparisons between the PHQ-9 and the SCID.  The result was that the pooled results showed that depression prevalence estimates with the PHQ-9 (total score ≥ 10) were about 25% and for the SCID it was 12%.  Modifying the criteria for the PHQ-9 to a score of ≥ 14 and using a separate PHQ-9 diagnostic algorithm resulted in a lower prevalence estimate but a wide margin of error.  The authors conclude that structured interviews are the best approach to prevalence estimates largely because they are closer to clinician style interviews and through clarification, they can limit confounding variables. Nobody ever seems to comment on the restrictive aspects of both checklists and structured interviews.  After all,  DSM criteria that are embedded in the matrix of questions and elaborations in the SCID are basically converted to nine unidimensional questions in the PHQ-9. It should be obvious that there would be a correlation between the two when the PHQ-9 is validated against the SCID, but instead it is accepted as an academic exercise.

The first thing I thought about when I saw these numbers and read the paper was “even the SCID prevalence figures are too high”.  I base that on numbers available in a standard textbook on psychiatric epidemiology (2).  Reviewing much larger sample sizes across 25 countries yields one-year prevalence figures for depression of 2.6-10.3% (median 5.3%) lifetime prevalence figures of 2 to 16.2% (median 8.6%). In that table the variation in very large community samples ranging from 5000 to 42,000 subjects in the United States seem to depend on the research methodology more than anything and structured interviews other than the SCID were used.

The selected samples from reference 1 are detailed in table 1 and very few of them are community samples. They are relatively small outpatient samples of identified medical patients or people seeking medical services for themselves or another person. Many of the conditions have known comorbidity with depression. The authors list this as a study limitation particularly “where the presence of transdiagnostic somatic symptoms and adjustment to illness or injury may have contributed to error variance”.  They also comment on the heterogeneity of the study settings and how that might affect the data. That is certainly my concern for post stroke patients, multiple sclerosis patients, Parkinson’s disease patients, epilepsy outpatients, and other neurological conditions for depression is a common comorbidity. The implicit message from this paper is that depression prevalence estimates from clinical samples will be higher than estimates from epidemiological community surveys.

But there is a much larger lesson here than differences in depression prevalence estimates based on methodology or clinical sample. For me the heart of the matter is the difference between a psychiatric interview, a structured clinical interview, and a checklist.  I have expressed my concerns over the years that checklists are currently surrogates for psychiatric interviews and I can confirm this on a weekly basis. Most the patients I see have seen primary care physicians or nonpsychiatrists and they tell me how they are given a PHQ-9, a diagnosis based on that rating scale, and a prescription. That model of care is promoted by some organizations as “evidence-based medicine”. In some cases it is called “measurement based medicine”. The state of Minnesota for example has a project were all PHQ-9 scores are collected from any clinic treating patients with a diagnosis of major depression. This was supposed to be some kind of quality measure even though an analysis of all the cross-sectional data has never been done.

When I talk with people who have taken these checklists and asked them about depression it is common to hear the question “What do you mean by depression? I am still not sure about what that means and the difference between depression and anxiety.” I hear those questions from people who have been filling out the rating scales and getting medications prescribed to them based on those scores and yet they are uncertain about the concept of depression. How can that happen?

The obvious way is by limiting choices. If a nine-item checklist is given to a person and they are told to answer a specific question as one of 4 choices, most people will check a box.  In the case of the SCID – there is more elaboration.  People are asked about whether there was a time in the last month when they felt “depressed or down most of the day nearly every day?”. They are asked to elaborate and whether or not it affected their interest or pleasure in activities. They are asked if it lasted as long as two weeks. At that point there is a qualifier that says the interviewer is not supposed to include symptoms “that are clearly due to a physical condition, mood-incongruent delusions or hallucinations, incoherence are marked loosening of associations, or that are clearly part of the residual or prodromal phases of schizophrenia”. Additional questions about symptoms of the depressive syndrome follow.

Many clinics use electronic health record (EHR) templates that include checklists about all of the major classes of psychiatric syndromes. They are a variation on the SCID but they generally result in more spontaneity and elaboration than a checklist but not as much as the structured interview. What is lost along the way?  I would suggest – a lot.

The rationale for structured interviews is reliability or consistency in responses.  If any population is given a matrix of the same questions to differentiate different conditions – no matter how exhaustive - there will be a pattern of responses that has internal consistency. Viewed from that perspective, the PHQ-9 is just a very abbreviated and less specific version of the SCID – hence the difference in prevalence estimates.

Although prevalence estimates are often the focus of criticism (too high, too low, just right) what is typically missed is that they really have limited application to good clinical psychiatry. Psychiatrists do not do SCID interviews on patients and the reasons may not be that apparent. Psychiatric diagnoses depend on a lot more than a symptom checklist and the total time to administer a SCID (2-3 hours) is prohibitive. There is also a question of efficiency.  In practice the psychiatrist has to be able to focus on all relevant aspects of the identified problem not areas that are not considered to be a problem.  Most importantly – the psychiatric interview needs to recognize that the person in the conversation has a unique conscious state that is interpreting their emotional, cognitive, and physical experience. The psychiatrists has to understand how that is happening.

There is probably no better discussion of this crucial aspect of the interview than that provided by Nordgaard, Sass and Parnas (3). These authors use the term “a conversational, phenomenologically oriented interview, performed by am experienced and reliability-trained psychiatrist.”  as the more optimal and preferred approach.  After reading their work, I realized that it is what I have been doing for the past 35 years.  In a more recent article, this group has compared American phenomenology to a simple study of signs and symptoms and suggested their use of the term is more consciousness based:

“It refers to a faithful exploration, description, and conceptualization of the patient’s contents and structures of subjective life and modes of existence (eg, not only the content of the delusion but its mode of emergence and articulation and ways of experiencing the delusion)” (4)

They suggest this requires an interview that maximizes self-description and a knowledgeable physician with a “rich conceptual repertoire”.  Since the DSM approach is intentionally atheoretical – it speaks to the need to be trained in a variety of psychopathological theories.  Andreasen (5) has previously written about the death of phenomenology as being an unintended consequence of the DSM approach.  In my experience it is easily approached in residency training as the need for a empathy based formulation that makes sense to the patient.  In their article (3) the authors provide a table comparing what is elicited with a structured interview as opposed to a phenomenologically based conversational interview.  In the table below I provide my own example for a patient with depression. I will add that in most electronic health records these days there are templates that are essentially structured interviews requiring brief responses and very little discussion about the process or content of those responses. Those templates are further limited by the fact that all of the information needs to be entered by the psychiatrist doing the interview - a further inefficiency.

Structured Interview
Conversational Interview
She has been depressed all of her life with very few periods of neutral mood. The depression includes periods of extreme irritability.  The depression worsens from time to time.
She had had long term depression but it is clearly worsened in specific contexts. There are situations that specifically make her anxiety worse and when this happens, she “spirals down” into a depression and will often spend the entire weekend in bed. A lot of these episodes are associated with a stressful job and a specific interpersonal conflict at work.
She describes a motivational deficits and anhedonia.
During the episodes of worsening depression and isolation – she watches TV all day long. She is not motivated to exercise but occasionally will push herself to go for a jog. She was the high school state record holder in the quarter mile. Even though it is initially difficult she feels much better afterwards and the activity reminds her of the importance of exercise in her life and how she used to work out in high school.
Decreased concentration and memory problems
She has had life long concerns about her memory and at one point considered “getting tested” for ADHD. She got a degree in molecular biology and graduated summa cum laude. She is currently working in a professor's lab and thinking of applying for a PhD program. She has no problem reading and retaining information from highly technical journals and devising lab protocols or her favorite science fiction. She attends meetings where her mind wanders.
Depressing thoughts
“I am a perfectionist and am my own worst critic.” She was encouraged from an early age to get A grades in school and had a nearly catastrophic reaction when she got a B in high school.  She still remembers that teacher who told her that getting a B would be “good for her”. Her parents were always critical and she realized at some level she has internalized some of these criticisms especially when it comes to body image and weight: “I don’t think being petite and wearing the latest fashions makes me a better scientist”. Despite fairly constant self-criticism it never gets to the point where she feels worthless.  
I have some suicidal thoughts but have never made a suicide attempt or an attempt to hurt myself.
“I read a journal article somewhere that looked at the prevalence of suicidal thoughts and they are fairly common.” She describes intrusive thoughts about suicide that are obsessional in nature. “I drive across this bridge every day.  If I am having a bad day, I think about cranking the wheel at the half way point and driving off. But I know I will never do it.  I am too chicken and I have too much going for me.  I want to hang around and see what happens.”

The conversational interview is information rich and allows for more extensive pattern matching.  The PHQ-9 and even the SCID describes a very limited pattern or as Kendler (6) describes indexing of major psychiatric disorders.  That is the primary (and limited) intent of the DSM.  But Kendler points out that it is really a jumping off point for the additional study of psychopathology.  I would also point out that it ignores what is the elephant in the room for psychiatrists – human consciousness.  Consciousness in psychiatry tends to be mentioned only when it is grossly impaired rather than existing as the every day moderator of everything.

When the additional pattern matching takes place, the only real limit is the interviewer’s ability to recognize it and what it means. In the ideal world that should lead to further elaboration of the patient’s concerns, education based on the psychiatrist’s understanding of the general problem and more specifically how it affects the unique patient, and specific treatments that have worked before.  It can extend to a unique approach to the associated DSM disorder that would not have been possible with a highly structured interview.  One of the best examples I can think of are life long sleep problems that become anxiety and depressive disorders as an adult – because the development of those disorders and the sleep disorder is not covered in detail.  There are a lot of examples.

In closing this post, prevalence estimates for psychiatric disorders vary greatly.  That is the expected result of the screening methodology that includes the instrument used, the population sampled, and the prevalence of the disorder being screened in the population. Very basic screens like checklists used as a proxy for diagnoses will have the highest prevalence estimates. More comprehensive structured interviews will be somewhat lower. The gold standard for epidemiological work (structured interview) is not the gold standard for clinical work (the semi-structured phenomenologically oriented interview).  It is also the reason psychiatrists need to know psychopathology, phenomenology, and case formulations based on those disciplines.

George Dawson, MD, DFAPA



References:
  
1:  Levis B, Benedetti A, Ioannidis JPA, et al. Patient Health Questionnaire-9 scores do not accurately estimate depression prevalence: individual participant data meta-analysis. J Clin Epidemiol. 2020;122:115128.e1. doi:10.1016/j.jclinepi.2020.02.002

2:  Hasin DS, Fenton MC, Weissman MM.  Epidemiology of depression disorders. In: Tsuang MT, Tohen M, Jones PB, editors.  Textbook of Psychiatric Epidemiology, Third Edition. West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2011: 289-309.

3:  Nordgaard J, Sass LA, Parnas J. The psychiatric interview: validity, structure, and subjectivity. Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci. 2013;263(4):353364. doi:10.1007/s00406-012-0366-z

4:  Parnas J, Zanderson M. Rediscovering disordered selfhood in schizophrenia. Psychiatric Times.   Jun 08, 2020

5:  Nancy C. Andreasen, DSM and the Death of Phenomenology in America: An Example of Unintended Consequences, Schizophrenia Bulletin, Volume 33, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 108–112, https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbl054

6:  Kendler KS. DSM issues: incorporation of biological tests, avoidance of reification, and an approach to the "box canyon problem". Am J Psychiatry. 2014;171(12):12481250. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2014.14081018




Sunday, August 21, 2016

Indexing Versus Diagnosis - A Non-trivial Difference?




There was an interesting article written by Kenneth S. Kendler, MD in this month's American Journal of Psychiatry.  It addresses a phrase that I have seen in typed evaluations that causes me to cringe: "The patient does/does not meet criteria for major depression."  I was asked why that phrase bothered me so much and I basically pointed out that I don't care whether a person "meets criteria" for a specific DSM criteria - the overall assessment was more important to me.  Kendler describes the difference in terms of phenomenology - are there other aspects of depression that merit further description than what is in the DSM?  That seems true to me as well as, the time domain of symptoms development and how some of the critical symptoms may have developed.  On a developmental basis - sleep, anxiety, and depression all may have different time frame and given the length of time that the DSM approach has been around - there has been very little discussion of some of the key convergences and divergences.  Is primary insomnia beginning in middle school associated with depression in the twenties - the same problem as no insomnia in childhood and depression in the twenties.

To study the issue Kendler looks at 19 textbooks and 18 symptoms domains described in each of those textbooks.  He has specific criteria for textbook selection that resulted in 19 texts from 5 countries published between 1899 to 1956.  He included full criteria published by Wendell Muncie in 1939 and Aubrey Lewis in 1934 as being particularly instructive.  He looks at the number of authors describing a particular symptoms and additional descriptors of the symptoms they found in depressive states.  Just looking at neurovegetative states, the results are interesting.  The atypical depressive symptoms of hypersomnia and increased appetite and weight gain were essentially absent. Fourteen authors described sleep problems as initial insomnia or non restorative sleep.  Three authors described early morning awakening.  Poor appetite was listed by 10 authors and weight loss by 9 authors.  Anhedonia was listed by seven authors.  Kendler provides a detailed analysis of the remaining symptoms and how many of the authors consider these symptoms to be representative of depression.

One of the most instructive aspects of the paper was a direct comparison with DSM5 criteria across 18 symptoms, whether they are covered in the DSM and to what extent.  The symptoms not covered included volition/motivation, speech, other physical symptoms, anxiety, and depersonalization/derealization.  Experienced clinicians commonly encounter depressed people with all of these symptoms in everyday practice.  As an example, some of the most severely depressed people that I have treated were somatically focused to one degree or another on a continuum to the point of somatic delusions.  Adhering to DSM5 criteria would leave out the most important feature of their illness.  A more complete description of these symptoms allows for a better demarcation of the line between depression and psychotic depression - a critical line for developing a treatment plan.  Another critical aspect is the relationship between anxiety and depression.  The DSM tends to sacrifice a broader phenomenological approach for narrow, easily determined diagnostic markers.  Instead of describing the anxiety associated with depression, depressed patients often end up with additional diagnoses of anxiety disorders and in the DSM field trials it appears that anxiety and depression morph into on another and the criteria appear to have low diagnostic reliability in that context.

The broader concept from Kendler's philosophical perspective is whether meeting criteria is that same thing as having the disorder.  From a phenomenological perspective it is certainly possible to produce detailed analysis of patients that do not resemble one another in many regards.  Considering the fact that depression is always mapped onto unique conscious states that should not be too surprising.  Kendler's idea is that the DSM5 criteria do a "reasonable but incomplete job of assessing the prominent symptoms and signs of depression in the western post Kraepelinian tradition  ".  The idea of indexing cases of depression from what is not depression is relevant here.  I think that he should have been a little more specific in his criticism.  I don't think they do a reasonable job when they are not part of a psychiatric assessment by a psychiatrist who has enough time to do a good job.  Taking the DSM5 criteria and converting them into a checklist and applying that to the masses comes to mind.  This is probably the most absurd conclusion to the indexing concept, surpassed only by telling those who are screened that "you meet criteria for depression and that meets our health plan criteria to start citalopram".

 Kendler points out the consequences of reifying diagnostic criteria to the point that they become distinct disorders in the absence of any quantitative markers.  Andreassen made similar arguments about DSM technology and the death of an interest in psychopathology in a previous paper (2).  Both authors seem to miss the mark in terms of what is really missed here.  The diagnostic nosology has shifted from a relative simple mind based paradigm to one that purports to pick up extreme conditions at the fringe of human behavior.  The accuracy of those diagnoses is less as the described disorders get more common.  Human consciousness appears to be the critical variable here and there remain very few commentators on this issue.  Psychiatric disorders become very complex once the psychiatrist goes far beyond symptom lists and even personality disorders and what is commonly considered personality traits to recognizing that the person in front of you is a truly unique conscious state associated with a unique neurobiological state.

              

George Dawson, MD DFAPA



References:

1: Kendler KS. The Phenomenology of Major Depression and the Representativeness and Nature of DSM Criteria. Am J Psychiatry. 2016 Aug 1;173(8):771-80. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2016.15121509. Epub 2016 May 3. PubMed PMID: 27138588.

2: Andreasen NC. DSM and the death of phenomenology in America: an example of unintended consequences. Schizophr Bull. 2007 Jan;33(1):108-12. Epub 2006 Dec 7. PubMed PMID: 17158191; PubMed Central PMCID: PMC2632284. (full text)


Attribution:

Quote at top is from reference 1 by Dr. Kendler.



Wednesday, May 2, 2012

A Consciousness Based Model


One of the criticisms of psychiatric treatment in particular drug therapies is that essentially nothing is known about psychopathology, neurobiology, or human genetics and therefore claiming that drug therapy is treating a pathological state is erroneous (1). "Chemical imbalance" can be used as a red herring along the way and I will try to address that in a later post.  In that post, I also hope to address the issue of disease states and whether or not they need to be strictly measurable.

For now, I want to discuss a model that I have used in clinical practice for the past decade that addresses both the issues of recovery and whether or not the drug altered state or treating an underlying pathological state is really the issue.  Let me start by saying I think it is irrelevant for the purposes of treatment.  I am first and foremost a clinical psychiatrist and not a researcher and my priority is at all times patient care.   My goal is to treat alterations in a person’s conscious state and restore their level of functioning with medications and/or psychotherapy that have been shown to work.   My goal is also not to introduce any new problems such as sedation, mood changes, rage, perceptual problems, ataxia, false memories, vertigo, or any number of subjective changes commonly seen as "side effects".

I found that the best way to proceed is to have an explicit discussion of the person’s conscious state and whether it has undergone any transformation associated with the reasons why they are seeing me.  I focus on the typical stream of consciousness that occurs each and every day and how it may have changed over the previous weeks or months or years.   I ask about whether or not getting back to that conscious state is a reasonable goal.  I point out that the phenomenology associated with a person's cognitive and emotional changes (2) can be followed in at least two dimensions at once - the psychopathological and the normal.

There are obviously problems with my approach. The subjective assessment of a psychopathological state and the subjective assessment of the baseline conscious state are difficult to do and they take time.  There are a large number of markers of psychopathological states but not so many for normal conscious states.  I often end up discussing broad outlines that include the typical stream of consciousness, fantasies, daydreams, defense mechanisms, distracting thoughts and typical thought patterns in certain situations such as driving into work each day.   I also ask about a global assessment and whether at any point during treatment the person feels like their original conscious state has been restored.   It adds another goal to treatment that is focused on restoring the self rather than just treating symptoms.

George Dawson, MD, DFAPA

1: Moncrieff J, Cohen D.  How do psychiatric drugs work?  BMJ. 2009 May 29;338:b1963.

2: Andreasen NC. DSM and the death of phenomenology in america: an example of unintended consequences. Schizophr Bull. 2007 Jan;33(1):108-12. Epub 2006 Dec 7.