Philosophy of psychiatry: rhetoric or reality?

 

“If you laid all philosophers end-to-end it would be a good thing.”  Anonymous philosopher lecturing medical students somewhere in the Midwest in the 1980s. 

 

This post is a partial commentary on a paper about the philosophy of psychiatry (1) that was recently published.  Since I am not a philosopher and do not aspire to be one – I thank the authors for commenting on what they believe the key issues and limitations are. Over the years I have written about philosophical conjecture about psychiatry and consider much of it to be serious overreach. This paper will allow me to make some general observations.  The authors in this case have all published previous work on the subject and given the number of co-authors this is considered a state-of-the art review.  The review is open access and can be read at the link in the reference.

In their introduction the authors – consider metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical issues to be critical at the grey zone between medicine and philosophy.  They mention Karl Jaspers as a seminal figure in the field but emphasize their focus in the paper will be on conceptual competence defined as: “the transformative awareness of the ways by which background conceptual assumptions held by clinicians, patients, and society influence and shape aspects of clinical care” (2).  To their credit they explicitly comment on controversies about what the parameters of good philosophy are and whether progress is made over time.

Their first point is on the boundaries of disorder.  They make the usual observations about Kraepelinian and neo-Kraepelinian and conclude that “neo-Kraepelinians (NKs) claimed that precisely defined diagnostic criteria could be used to discover the specific biological causes of psychiatric syndromes and establish psychiatry as a branch of medicine.”  There is plenty of evidence that the NKs were much more sophisticated than that.  From one of their references (3): 

“The medical model is not based on any assumptions about etiology. It can accept social and psychological causes as well as physical and chemical events.  It can accept single causes or multiple causes.  It can even be applied when the etiology is unknown as in many clinical investigations.”

Guze specifies in several places that the diagnosis is for describing what is known about the patient and treatment planning. He suggests that medicine and psychiatry may evolve to provide more information on pathophysiology and testing but does not link it to diagnostic criteria apart from how it might be studied. He does not suggest that biological causes are necessary to establish psychiatry as a branch of medicine – his entire monograph is about why psychiatry is already a branch of medicine.

The next transition is to Insel and the RDoC.  The criticism seems to be that Insel was criticizing biological psychiatry but I doubt that any biological psychiatrist would see translational neuroscience as being inconsistent with a brain and biological centric psychiatry. The field is described as “lurching from one model to another”.  Excluding homosexuality as a diagnosis is given as a notable example of diagnostic controversy rather than psychiatry (specifically Spitzer) getting it right and leading society in general by about 40 years.  There are still plenty of people who have not caught up.

The first main section of their paper is the nature of mental illnesses.  They define strong naturalism as the factual and value free description of a disorder like what occurs in the natural sciences. They equate biological psychiatry with neurobiological dysfunction – even though those psychiatrists clearly had a much more sophisticated view of psychopathology.  I have quoted their reference to Guze above – here is an additional quote from prominent biological psychiatrists of the 20^th century:

“It should be emphasized…that the demonstration of…[a catecholamine] abnormality would not necessarily imply a genetic or constitutional, rather than an environmental or psychological, etiology of depression…it is equally conceivable that early experiences of the infant or child may cause enduring biochemical changes and that these may predispose some individuals to depressions in adulthood…[and] any comprehensive formulation of the physiology of affective state will have to include many other concomitant biochemical, physiological, and psychological factors.” (4)

That sounds like pluralism rather than naturalism to me.  There are several additional factors that suggest that the idea of strong naturalism is an exaggeration of the position of late 20^th century biological psychiatrists.  Some of those factors include: the concept of heterogeneity in diagnostic categories was widely known at the time, endophenotyping was introduced in 1966 as a purely biological concept (5) that was later applied to medicine and psychiatry (6).  Clinical trialists were certainly aware of heterogeneity and significant problems with recruiting patients into studies based on severity and placebo response.  The general comparison to medical conditions where a significant portion were idiopathic and had speculative pathogenesis and to this day are still diagnosed based on clinical description is an additional factor.  Any intern on medicine or surgery knows pathophysiology and the suggested mechanism of action of medications is typically speculative and no two patients with the same diagnosis are exactly alike.  A key concept in training is that physicians are required to recognize that pattern and make the necessary adaptations.

The authors introduce the definition of strong normativism as basically “no natural, objectively describable set of biological processes that we can characterize as “dysfunctional”, and hence disorder attributions are thoroughly value-laden.”  They do not elaborate – but this definition is clearly counter to the experience of any physician who has treated life threatening or severe illnesses.

Szasz is introduced at that point because of his suggestion that mental illnesses do not exist but rather represent “judgments of deviance based on sociocultural norms”.  They suggest that he is both a strong normativist and a strong naturalist rather than just being wrong.  Szasz’s philosophy (if that is what it was) fails several tests, but for the purpose of this post is probably the best example of controlling the premise rhetoric to prove a point.  The Szasz definition of disease as actual observable pathology allows him to trivialize any condition not meeting that criterion (and there are probably more outside of psychiatry than within) and call it a value judgment.  That is not consistent with diagnostic systems present before him or what historical neuropathologists thought (7).

What follows is a section on the naturalist-normativist debate including a table of the contrasting points. The basic problem with this dichotomy is that the normativist position as described by the authors is such a caricature when compared with medical and psychiatric training that it really cannot be seen as a viable position by anyone but Szasz.  They produce a couple of examples of hybrid positions as though they have never been considered in the past.  The description of Wakefield’s suggestion that dysfunction that is harmful to the individual is required for disorder, but since depression is an evolutionary response to adversity it is not dysfunction.  That ignores empirical research that suggests that it can be both as well as the problems associated with speculation in evolutionary psychology. The discussion of values in the normative model leaves out a lot and ignores psychiatric training. If the goal is to inform psychiatric practice by this kind of debate there are better ways to go. Psychiatrists walk into the room with a patient and their goal is to understand that patient well and treat that patient well. That involves communication skill, developing a therapeutic alliance, therapeutic neutrality, and providing the patient with enough information so that they can provide informed consent.  That interaction is both scientifically and professionally informed.

The next concept the authors discuss is essentialism or the idea that naturally occurring kinds have an evident essence. They acknowledge that when it comes to medical disorders straightforward classification is generally problematic but for some reason it is more problematic for psychiatry. They suggest that:

“If psychiatric classifications such as the DSM and the ICD were demarcating natural kinds, we would expect each diagnosis to correspond to an entity that exists in the structure of the world, independent of human interests.”

That quote misses the mark at a couple of levels.  First, a classification system is really not a diagnosis. It is more of a hypothesis and general locator (8). The diagnosis takes additional information including some of the validators that they minimize in this section. Second, in looking at these features it is obvious that many of the big ones – like mania “exist in the world independent of human interests.”  They have after all been described since ancient times across multiple diagnostic systems – long before there were psychiatrists.  The same is true of melancholia and several other disorders. Granted – there was no DSM back then but I cannot think of better evidence that there are natural kinds by this definition that have been updated. Third, it should be obvious that many disorders are clearly there for research purposes and this is evidenced by the fact that only about 50% of the diagnoses are used on a clinical basis and many psychiatrists attest to the fact that they doubt a single case of specific disorders exist (9,10).  Finally, essentialism in biology became a casualty of evolution.  Prior to Darwin, Linnaeus suggested that species were distinct and unchanging entities created by God.  That is an essentialist position. Evolutionary theory changed all of that because species change based on individual variation and new species occur (11). 

Whenever I read about the philosophical concepts behind what constitutes psychiatric illness and classification – I am always left considering why philosophy is prioritized over biology.  Medicine is after all firmly rooted in human biology.  There is no better evidence than the biochemistry, anatomy, and physiology courses taken in medical school basic science.  Biology provides a framework for both hierarchical organization as well as individual classification of diseases including mental disorders (see lead graphic). Modern taxonomic classifications of both date back to the mid -18^th century.

A critical question is whether biological classification has advanced to the point where it is not controversial and purely scientific.  The short answer is no. There is ample evidence that the taxonomy of living organisms is problematic and there are ongoing controversies over the past 50 years.  Although species is a fundamental organizational concept in the field of biology that has not prevented the proliferation of up to 24 different species concepts in recent times (12).  Why would medicine be expected to have a more clearly defined classification system than biology?

Rather than comment on the remaining sections that I am sure that I also have problems with – I am going to introduce and idea that I have not seen written about anywhere.  If you read this an think I am wrong please let me know and send references.  That idea is the application of biological theory to psychiatry. Medicine and psychiatry are after all firmly based in human biology and human biology is a subset of biology in general.  When you attend medical school and complete all the basic science training this basic fact is explicit. There is not much discussion of other organisms unless they happen to be pathogens.  There is also not much discussion of the levels of organization in human biology and the implications that has for medicine.

What does the tremendous complexity of biology have to do with psychiatry? It is evident that various mechanisms make it very difficult to classify biological organisms.  That has resulted in many species concepts and that array of concepts has complicate taxonomy at a time when the biodiversity of the planet remains inadequately characterized. Psychiatry is operating only in one species by the same mechanisms that complicate biology at all levels also complicate biology.  To the purpose of this essay the critical question is why they currently seem less important than the increasing presence of philosophy in psychiatry. Frequently the justification seems to be the old quote about “carving nature at the joints.”  Does that mean we philosophize about it and maintain endless arguments?  Or does it mean we consider that human beings and their mental disorders are based in human biology and try to make sense of it by studying biological principles.  And by biological principles – I don’t mean the typical jargon of biological psychiatry used by critics. I mean theoretical biology practiced by biologists.      

I want to touch on just two concepts from biology that have implications for psychiatric controversies.  The first are the classification systems in biology and the second is stochastics.  There are any number of authors offering descriptions about how psychiatry has evolved in the last 200 years. That generally tracing the origins back to 19^th century European schools of thought and bringing those threads forward.  The focus is generally on nosology including diagnostic systems, treatment settings, and how treatments evolved.  The brief discussion of biological classification here touches on a large literature that has been ignored by medicine and psychiatry.  In the debate of categorical versus dimensional diagnoses and the various philosophical labels a significant number of biological classifiers have been left out.

If I am correct what might have caused this significant omission? First, the focus of medicine has been description based on clinical findings.  I have used this characterization previously:

"For several thousand years physicians have recorded observations and studies about their patients.  In the accumulating facts they have recognized patterns of disordered bodily functions and structures as well as forms of mental aberration.  When such categories were sufficiently distinctive, they were termed diseases and given specific names. “

DeGowan and DeGowan, Bedside Diagnostic Examination. 1976, p 1

That has been the historical and primary focus of medicine. Interest in pathogenesis happened in the 19^th century but even then, there were conditions that that escaped that classification.  There has been progress there are still many conditions with no clear pathophysiology and even fewer medications where the mechanism of action is known. One of the primary reasons is that medicine has been based on reductionist biology and even though advances have been made it seems to have reached its limit. What do I mean by reductionist biology?  Simply put it means breaking down complex systems to component parts and studying those parts independently.  In current jargon it has also been referred to as a bottom-up approach.  Second – biological psychiatry is biological in the reductive scientific sense and it needs to be biological in the integrative sense. All biology is not reductive (17,18) – but much of the philosophy I have read seems to think so.  Reductive approaches have led to discrete research programs that produce highly speculative connections to psychiatric disorders. We end up with biological psychiatry as neurochemistry -> neuroendocrinology -> neuroimaging -> genomes, connectomes, proteomes, transcriptomes, metabolomes, etc without any clear underlying connection to all human biology.  Systems biology or network medicine approaches have been used on only a partial basis so far.  Third, rather than make a truly biological connection the field seems to have been sidetracked by philosophy.  Much of that philosophy has been around for 50 years or more and seems satisfied with the role of asking questions and never really providing much of an answer.  Much of the philosophy is vague and untestable.  A secondary role seems to be the criticism of psychiatry with a dependence more on political rhetoric than reality.

Conclusion:

When philosophers criticize medicine and psychiatry, they frequently use the term constructs.  From a rhetorical perspective not, all constructs are alike.  In medicine and biology there needs to be at least some real-world observable basis.  

Rather than strong arguments for philosophy in psychiatry – the authors have argued strongly. I have tried to elucidate the rhetoric involved since my observation is that is the nature of most philosophical arguments directed at psychiatry.  The curious aspect is that most people do not even consider this when reading philosophers commenting on psychiatry.  I sent one of my papers to a friend who has been a psychiatrist as long as I have and he told me that he never considered it an area for analysis. I hope that some of the comments here are useful in considering these arguments and why they should not be blindly accepted.

It seems that in all the philosophical criticism and discussion of psychiatry, van Fraassen's empirical adequacy has been ignored (16, 17).  The reasons for that may be less than obvious.  Van Frassen basically states that an empirically adequate model is just that – it is not a comment on the truth of existence or not.  There is a question of whether the model must be based on direct observation.  The criteria for mental disorders require reporting subjective states that are not directly observable. Van Fraassen’s theory includes the outcomes of experiments and isomorphic models – both of which apply to work in psychiatric nosology. The lack of comment on Van Fraasen’s approach is critical because it reflects how psychiatrists are actually trained and directly counters arguments about positivism and realism. Some references suggest that what appear to be diametrically opposed arguments in philosophy are just sustained with no resolution and that is a significant limiting factor when considering what psychiatrists need to know.           

Not all biology is reductionist and not all philosophy is useful.  Empirical adequacy and biological complexity are the future of psychiatry.

 

George Dawson, MD, DFAPA

 

References:

1:  Stein DJ, Nielsen K, Hartford A, Gagné-Julien AM, Glackin S, Friston K, Maj M, Zachar P, Aftab A. Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications. World Psychiatry. 2024 Jun;23(2):215-232. doi: 10.1002/wps.21194. PMID: 38727058; PMCID: PMC11083904.

2:  Aftab A, Waterman GS. Conceptual competence in psychiatry: recommendations for education and training. Acad Psychiatry 2021;45:203-9.

3: Guze SB. Why psychiatry is a branch of medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. p. 38.

4:  Schildkraut JJ, Kety SS. Biogenic amines and emotion. Science. 1967;156 (3771):21-37.

5:  John B, Lewis KR. Chromosome variability and geographic distribution in insects. Science. 1966 May 6;152(3723):711-21. doi: 10.1126/science.152.3723.711. PMID: 17797432.

6:  McGuffin P, Farmer A, Gottesman II. Is there really a split in schizophrenia? The genetic evidence. Br J Psychiatry. 1987 May;150:581-92. doi: 10.1192/bjp.150.5.581. PMID: 3307978.

7:  Pies R.  Did Szasz Misunderstand Virchow’s Concept of disease? Psychiatric Times. Feb 21, 2024.  https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/did-szasz-misunderstand-virchow-s-concept-of-disease

8:  Kendler KS. The Phenomenology of Major Depression and the Representativeness and Nature of DSM Criteria. Am J Psychiatry. 2016 Aug 1;173(8):771-80. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2016.15121509. Epub 2016 May 3. PMID: 27138588.

9:  Munk-Jørgensen P, Najarraq Lund M, Bertelsen A. Use of ICD-10 diagnoses in Danish psychiatric hospital-based services in 2001-2007. World Psychiatry. 2010 Oct;9(3):183-4. doi: 10.1002/j.2051-5545.2010.tb00307.x. PMID: 20975866; PMCID: PMC2948730. 

10:  Müssigbrodt H, Michels R, Malchow CP, Dilling H, Munk-Jørgensen P, Bertelsen A. Use of the ICD-10 classification in psychiatry: an international survey. Psychopathology. 2000 Mar-Apr;33(2):94-9. doi: 10.1159/000029127. PMID: 10705253

11:  Hey J.  Genes, categories, and species. NY, NY. Oxford University Press, 2001: p 60-61.

12:  De Queiroz K. Ernst Mayr and the modern concept of species. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2005 May 3;102(suppl_1):6600-7.

13:  Mayr E. Biological classification: toward a synthesis of opposing methodologies. Science. 1981 Oct 30;214(4520):510-6. doi: 10.1126/science.214.4520.510.

14:  Mayr E. Biology is not postage stamp collecting. Interview by R. Lewin. Science. 1982 May 14;216(4547):718-20. doi: 10.1126/science.7079730. PMID: 7079730.

15:  Ho CC, Lau SK, Woo PC. Romance of the three domains: how cladistics transformed the classification of cellular organisms. Protein Cell. 2013 Sep;4(9):664-76. doi: 10.1007/s13238-013-3050-9. Epub 2013 Jul 19.

16:  Van Fraassen.  BC.  The Empirical Stance.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

17:  Monton, Bradley and Chad Mohler, "Constructive Empiricism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/constructive-empiricism/>.First published Wed Oct 1, 2008; substantive revision Tue Apr 13, 2021

18:  Loscalzo J, Kohane I, Barabasi AL. Human disease classification in the postgenomic era: a complex systems approach to human pathobiology. Mol Syst Biol. 2007;3:124. doi: 10.1038/msb4100163. Epub 2007 Jul 10. PMID: 17625512; PMCID: PMC1948102.

19:  Van Regenmortel MH. Reductionism and complexity in molecular biology. Scientists now have the tools to unravel biological and overcome the limitations of reductionism. EMBO Rep. 2004 Nov;5(11):1016-20. doi: 10.1038/sj.embor.7400284. PMID: 15520799; PMCID: PMC1299179.

 

Dedication:  This post is dedicated to my undergraduate biology Professors at Northland College including Lee Stadnyk, Richard Verch, John Brennan, and Mallanpali Rao. I spent many months studying the comparative anatomy and physiology of invertebrates and the taxonomy and population dynamics of sphagnum moss plant species, aquatic invertebrates, and freshwater plankton with these professors and they were the best.  I also had the pleasure of working on Loblolly Pine (Pinus taeda) and Douglas Fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii) species in Don Durzan’s lab at the Institute of Paper Chemistry. Experience in biology is a grounding in the complexity of living organisms.

More on Epistemic Injustice

 

I became aware of a paper on epistemic injustice (1) this morning and just finished reading the paper.  I wrote a blog on this topic with reference to one of the paper the authors discussed about 2 ½ years ago and I was interested in learning if the authors agreed or disagreed with my position. As suggested by the title – my position was that the concept of epistemic injustice was misapplied to psychiatry and further that it was misapplied in much the same way that other philosophical concepts have been. That misapplication typically begins with a false premise and the application of the concept is built upon that.

I took the original authors definitions of epistemic injustice in my original post.  The current paper defines epistemic injustice as occurring in two forms and once again I will quote the authors directly:

“Testimonial injustice arises when an individual’s factual report about some issue is ignored or taken to be unreliable because of individual characteristics that are not related to her epistemic (knowledge-having) ability.” (p. 1)

“Hermeneutic injustice… an individual’s knowledgeable reports fail to receive adequate attention because she, her listeners, or society as a whole lack the conceptual resources to interpret them.”

They give numerous examples both within and outside the field of psychiatry analyzing the arguments about why the epistemic injustice does or does not exist. I took the same steps in the previous blog post and my arguments were very similar to the authors of the current paper.  We basically agree that psychiatrists need to be focused on the subjective state of the patient.  That means we cannot arbitrarily discount what anybody says. We are also trained to not discount histories based on the demographic, social or interpersonal features of the patient.  In fact, we are the only physicians trained to recognize those tendencies and correct them.  The authors also agreed that all of the patient’s narrative need not be arbitrarily accepted and as an example they describe a patient who is at high risk for suicide and who is denying any risk in the emergency setting despite obvious evidence to the contrary.   They suggest just accepting the narrative for the sake of social justice may result in patients being placed at risk. I agree with that opinion.

I addressed this issue in my original post by describing what I consider to be the clinical method of psychiatry.  That involves listening carefully to the patient but at the same time deciding about the continuity and plausibility of the narrative.  This is a general process independent of any specific patient characteristic that recognizes all human informants make errors and that there are multiple reasons for these errors.  In other words, this general process needs to be applied to every patient professional encounter with a psychiatrist.  One of my mentors in residency also suggested that at some point it extends to everyone a psychiatrist talks with including informal contacts.  That means that psychiatrists may be analyzing many people that they encounter – but not in the psychoanalytic or mind reading sense.  

 The clinical process is important because it can refine the assessment and assist the patient in communicating the problems that brought them in to treatment. The goal of the interview is to establish a diagnosis and formulation and discuss them with the patient.  Agreement with the initial assessment forms the basis for treatment planning and the therapeutic alliance between the patient and the psychiatrist.  There are also therapeutic aspects to this communication.  Interventions like confrontation, clarification, and interpretation not only to improve the factual report but to assist the patient in recognizing active defenses that are limiting their insight into maladaptive behaviors and thought patterns.

The best way to counter any possibility of epistemic injustice is to keep teaching psychiatric methods exactly the way they are being taught right now.  Psychiatric trainees need to learn early on that analyzing the subjective communication is a rich source of information that cannot be denied, but may need to be clarified. There are never any clear reasons for rejecting this information – but like all psychiatric communication it all has to be seen through a critical lens and in some cases multiple hypotheses apply.

The authors have an interesting take as a footnote at the end of their paper on why some authors may be interested in applying a philosophical concept where it might not apply – especially if the critic is a psychiatrist.  There is after all an established pattern of some psychiatrists doing this.  From the paper:

“To the objection that psychiatrists are the ones writing some of these articles, we would suggest that being a psychiatrist does not protect one from misunderstandings – or more likely, misrepresentations – of one’s own field when in the grip of an idea. This should be no more surprising than the possibility of an anti-psychiatric psychiatrist, a familiar figure in the philosophy of psychiatry.”

The authors condense various motivations for misrepresentation as an intellectual idea.  That may be a possibility as a one off paper but what about a pattern over years and decades?  What about the associated self-promotion over those years? What about the inability to recognize the good work of hundreds of colleagues over that period or personal mistakes?  There are always many unasked and unanswered questions when it comes to an idea that criticizes an entire field of work.    

It is indisputable that no medical field has been mischaracterized more than psychiatry. Philosophy has been one of the vehicles used to do it. I hope that more papers are written to illustrate exactly how it happens. In the misapplication of epistemic injustice, it starts with a false premise and builds from there. Psychiatrists everywhere know that one of our best attributes is being able to talk to anyone and more specifically people that other physicians either do not want to talk with or are unable to. Most importantly – we are interested in talking with these people and can communicate with them in a productive manner. We do not get to that point by rejecting what people have to say or not paying attention to them.

The qualifier in my original post still applies:

“There is no doubt that people can be misdiagnosed. There is no doubt that things don’t always go well. There is a clear reason for that and that is everyone coming to see a psychiatrist has a unique conscious state. There is no catalog of every unique conscious state. The psychiatrist's job is to understand that unique conscious state and it happens through direct communication with that person.  That direct communication can happen only if the psychiatrist is an unbiased listener.”

There are plenty of external constraints that directly impact the time needed by a trained psychiatrist to interview and understand a person. That is probably a better focus for criticism than the continued misapplication of philosophical ideas.

George Dawson, MD, DFAPA

 

References:

1:  Kious BM, Lewis BR, Kim SY. Epistemic injustice and the psychiatrist. Psychological Medicine. 2023 Jan 5:1-5.

 

Epistemic Injustice Is Misapplied to Psychiatry

Some of the greatest minds in psychiatry have emphasized the importance of philosophy in the field and done some excellent work in that area. Unfortunately philosophy can also be used to attack the field and when it is, some of that work is not very well done. Since I’ve been writing this blog there have been a couple of examples. The first was the argument that the DSM-5 was a “blueprint for living”. My counterargument is available at this link and you can read the subsequent dialogue. It should be evident from my argument that the DSM-5 is the farthest thing from the blueprint for living that a psychiatrist could imagine. The political context for that article in the New York Times was the supposed controversy about the DSM-5. It was being portrayed in the media as almost apocalyptic and this opinion piece fit right in.  I always viewed the DSM-5 as the non-event that it proved to be.

The second couple of articles focused on critical psychiatry. One was an opinion piece about critical psychiatry and the second was a summary of critical psychiatry written by a couple of critical psychiatrists. In the philosophy literature as it applies to psychiatry there is always a lot of hedging around the issue of whether philosophical critics are anti-psychiatrists or something else. Some authors for example refer to them as skeptics. I have no problem with the school that sees them as anti-psychiatrists and made the argument that if critical psychiatrists based their criticism on antipsychiatry philosophers they are in fact anti-psychiatrists.

The latest philosophical criticism of psychiatry is an opinion piece (1) called “Epistemic injustice in psychiatry.” It is written by an author who has a doctorate in philosophy and is a psychiatrist and two academic philosophers. Their main thesis is that epistemic injustice occurs to a number of people based on biases against them and this prejudice undermines their credibility in that context.  In the case of medical treatment, that means the patient is not taken seriously and their treatment plan would be more unilateral on the part of the provider rather than collaborative and seriously considering their input. But I don’t want to minimize the authors definition and so I am including it at this point below:

“Epistemic injustice is harm done to a person in her capacity as an epistemic subject (a knower, a reasoner, a questioner) by undermining her capacity to engage in epistemic practices such as giving knowledge to others (testifying) or making sense of one’s experience (interpreting). It typically arises when a hearer does not take the statements of the speaker as seriously as they deserve to be taken.”

They cite racism and sexism as good examples where prejudical stereotypes lead to the subjects information being discounted. They build on this idea and suggest that people with mental illness are subjected to similar biases. From there they extrapolate and say that physicians and psychiatrists in particular make these same biased assessments and discount what patients say to them. They acknowledge that there are some circumstances where the credibility the patient may be questioned. They also suggest that this epistemic injustice is more likely to happen with psychiatric patients than other patients with physical illnesses. They suggest this has a detrimental effect on psychiatric patients, funding psychiatric services, and public perception.

They describe three examples of “epistemic injustice in psychiatry”. In all three cases the patients were put on acute psychiatric holds. In the first case a man claimed to be related to a Soviet leader and that was seen as delusional when it was true. In the second case a woman had cultural beliefs and practices that were misinterpreted as delusions. In the third case the patient had chronic suicidal thinking and visited the same cliff numerous times. He was admitted on hold when he was at the cliff for an hour and the decision was eventually made to treat him as a chronic high-risk patient on a voluntary basis. In all three cases the patients were released from the hospital by the civil commitment authority.

There are several problems with these vignettes and the inferences. The first is that the patients are being held on legal basis and not because of a psychiatric diagnosis. At least that is what happens in the United States. In other words, people cannot be held on the basis of a diagnosis they also have to present an imminent danger to themselves or others. It is a contested legal process and that in itself blurs the diagnosis and inhibits communication. The vignettes also seem to say that people are never adequately assessed based on their history and released even before the legal hold is released. As an acute care psychiatrist I have had to assess and release thousands of people when we determined that the history they gave us was accurate. In other words we believed them and released them. Of all the people I assessed and treated I am not aware of anyone who was released by a court because I made in an inaccurate assessment by not listening to the patient.

The authors move on to talk about contributory factors for epistemic injustice.  They discuss a number of archaic stereotypes (for a psychiatrist) of people with mental illness such as believing substance use users have a “lack of willpower” and that they are responsible for their own particular problems. I have never really met a psychiatrist with these beliefs and doubt that people with those beliefs go into psychiatry. I have certainly met other medical specialists with these beliefs and in fact argue with them regularly about that. The authors do have a rare point when they point out that negative stereotypes and stigma lead voters and politicians to underfund treatment for mental illness but that has nothing to do with the way psychiatrists communicate with their patients.

They discuss the topic of hard versus soft evidence. They use this to develop the argument that health professionals have epistemic power because “only they have access to this evidence and have the training to interpret it”. They really stretch to come up with the statement that some psychiatrists think of their patients as "objects of epistemic inquiry" rather than collaborators. I wonder if the authors are familiar with the psychiatric concept of therapeutic alliance. In the therapeutic alliance the psychiatrist and the patient are active collaborators and both the psychiatrist and the patient focus on solving problems that the patient identifies. That is an active process that as far as I know is taught to all psychiatrists. It wouldn’t work if a psychiatrist was looking at the patient as an object of inquiry.

The third contributor to epistemic injustice is negative stereotypes. The common stereotype mentioned by the authors is that “people with a mental illness are responsible for their condition”. I don’t think any psychiatrists think this way but at the end of this section the authors go back to making an argument about how psychiatric services are inadequately funded because the public and politicians maintain these negative stereotypes. So in the end two of the three contributory factors have more to do with the public’s lack of knowledge about psychiatric disorders than how psychiatrists function.

They discuss dementia and schizophrenia as conditions where the patient’s input may be minimized because of cognitive factors or their psychiatric status. The main stereotypes mentioned are the dangerousness stereotype with schizophrenia and the hopeless case stereotype with dementia. It is very difficult to understand how either of these descriptions support their main argument. Psychiatrists are trained to weigh what the patient is telling them and whether or not it might be plausible. Compared to practically all people - psychiatrists should have the best framework for what might or might not be plausible in the area of human behavior.  I can recall being interrupted during team meetings with news that one of my patients had communicated some behavior that the staff in the room were discounting as implausible and I suppose that is congruent with the authors’ argument. Those behaviors range from self reports of severe self endangering behavior to behaviors with a high likelihood of aggression. In most cases I considered the patient report to be accurate.  I had no doubt that a very low frequency behavior had occurred based on that patient’s history and in those cases it was generally corroborated.

The authors do not elaborate on the case where the patient's statements are uncritically accepted by the treating physician.  That is a likely cause of overprescribing and unnecessary testing.   

The entire first section of the paper does not seem to reflect modern psychiatric practice. I just put up a post on about 50 different factors that can be discussed with the patient at the end of the interview and a few real life examples of what is discussed. All treatment planning is based on what the patient says in that interview. The authors examples are cases where psychiatry and psychiatric assessment is secondary to legal considerations and all the impaired communication that involves. So there appears to be no epistemic injustice at the level of psychiatrist talking to patients in an outpatient setting.  The only exception would be a psychiatrist with insufficient expertise or one under severe constraints.  Those constraints can include a lack of time with the patient and unrealistic productivity and paperwork demands by the bureaucracy. 

The authors move on to discuss ways to overcome epistemic injustice. They suggest changing training to emphasize the subjective perspective of patients. I don’t understand that argument because the psychiatric evaluation should be focused entirely on the subjective perspective of patients. If the psychiatrist has any technical expertise at all, empathy is used to communicate that the psychiatrist knows what the patient is going through. The best description of empathy comes from British psychiatry as follows:

“Empathy is achieved by precise, insightful, persistent and knowledgeable questioning until the doctor is able to give an account of the patient’s subjective experience that the patient recognizes as his own.” (2)

That hardly seems like an exercise in disbelieving or ignoring what the patient has to say. Further psychiatric assessment should be focused on the entire conscious state of the patient rather than just what they have to say. Psychiatrists should be adept at diagnosing and treating patients who are unconscious and comatose, delirious, cognitively impaired, and experiencing severe psychiatric symptoms. A psychiatric assessment is more than believing what is said. I have frequently been in the position of having to explain to the patient what was happening to them and helping them make sense of their current experience. That is a singular focus on the patient’s subjective state when they are confused and unable to describe it.

The authors suggest multidisciplinary teams with a focus on the emotional aspects of care. I don’t know if that happens in England but in the United States I had team meetings every day for 22 years. The emotional aspect of care including interpersonal dynamics with patients and among the staff was routinely discussed in those meetings.

The authors suggest that medical students should be “taught to believe what psychiatric patients tell them unless there is a good reason not to do so”. My hope would be that medical students are able to see how attending physicians approach evaluations and treat psychiatric patients much differently than other physicians. The main factors that lead to that different approach include therapeutic neutrality, a lack of bias toward people with severe psychiatric disorders and addictions, and an ability to talk to all people with those problems. There is a more technical point that might not be as evident and that is psychiatrists are the only physicians who are systematically trained to understand and analyze their reactions to the patient and what that might mean. That is what psychiatrists do and why they are consulted by other physicians and by everyone else when problems are significant.

A much better approach is to go after institutional countertransference or the collective emotional and interpersonal reactions that can be seen institution wide based on psychiatric and addiction diagnoses. This is the single most important factor in being able to provide quality care to people with these conditions. A negative institutional countertransference toward these patients is evident in most hospitals and clinics where I have worked.  Only one person - the director of an emergency medicine program was interested in addressing it and had me speak as a consultant at a Grand Rounds on the subject. These negative attitudes are driven to an extent by stereotypes but also by the neglectful way society and political systems treat these people. They have been cast as a burden on the medical system, always uncooperative, people who deserve minimal if any treatment, and their treatment resources are cut to the bone. Psychiatrists working in these settings and promoting a model of therapeutic neutrality facilitating appropriate care is one of the best solutions - but more cooperation outside of the psychiatric community is needed.

In summary, epistemic injustice appears to be another philosophical concept that is misapplied to psychiatry.   There is no doubt that people can be misdiagnosed. There is no doubt that things don’t always go well. There is a clear reason for that and that is everyone coming to see a psychiatrist has a unique conscious state. There is no catalog of every unique conscious state. The psychiatrist's job is to understand that unique conscious state and it happens through direct communication with that person.  That direct communication can happen only if the psychiatrist is an unbiased listener.

George Dawson, MD, DFAPA

References:


1: Crichton P, Carel H, Kidd IJ. Epistemic injustice in psychiatry. BJPsych Bull.  2017 Apr;41(2):65-70. doi: 10.1192/pb.bp.115.050682. PubMed PMID: 28400962;

2: Sims A. Symptoms in the Mind. Elsevier Limited; London; 2003; p 3.


Graphic Credit:

The above photo was downloaded from Shutterstock per their standard user agreement.  The title is
Joshua Trees in Mojave Desert, California by Dean Stanisavljevic.

Can A Philosophy For Living Prevent Addiction?

A couple of years ago, I responded to a New York Times editorial by a philosopher.  It was focused on the release of the DSM-5 and like most pieces in the press, it was highly critical of psychiatry.  The philosopher's argument was basically that the DSM-5 had an implicit agenda.  That agenda was that it was a blueprint for living.  As an acute care psychiatrist for most of my life, that analysis was more than off the mark - it struck me as absurd.  The only advice about living that I gave people was lowest common denominator advice:

1.  Get a stable place to live where you feel safe and you can unwind each day.

2.  Get adequate sleep.

3.  Eat nutritious food.

4.  Get some exercise.

5.  Stop drinking.

6.  Stop using street drugs.

7.  Try to stop smoking.


This is advice where the patient has been unable to secure any of these elements, is also often physically ill, and we could offer active help.  None of that advice is contained in the DSM-5, but when you are treating people with severe psychiatric disorders it is useful and potentially life saving advice.  You can read about the "blueprint for living" argument and several additional arguments in the comments at this link.  One of my main points is that psychiatry and medicine in general are focused on extremes and not normative human conditions.  Medicine generally tries to draw a line (however imprecise) between the pathological and non-pathological.  The only real life lessons there are is how to avoid some pathological states.

The other part of my career in the outpatient setting is trying to convince people to stop using drugs and alcohol at various stages of addiction.  The pathway to addiction and the pathway to recovery back out again are complex.  Not everybody makes it.  The argument for recovery has always been quite basic.  Stop using or end up "crazy, in jail, or dead."  Far too many people are exposed.  As a reductionist, I teach that there is a certain portion of the population that is at high risk for addiction due to neurobiological factors.   There is also a portion of the population at low risk because of dissimilar factors.  With the current push toward universal cannabis legalization, widespread availability of opioids, and the idealization of hallucinogens and psychedelics larger and larger numbers of people at put at risk, just based on their biology.  The backdrop here of cycling between permissiveness and prohibition at the cultural level was noted by Musto a few decades ago.  The problem is that American society deals with that conflict by political arguments.  Those arguments are focused on liberalized drug use or prohibition without any common sense in between.  In the United States that no man's land points directly to a lack of a philosophy for living.

What do I mean by a philosophy for living?  To me it means a way of living that is based on reasoned principles rather than popular culture.  A way of living based on contemplation rather than impulse.  A way of living based on conscious decisions long before the time when the decisions are no longer conscious or reasoned.

The best example I can think of is from the field of addiction.  There is always a lot of confusion over the issue of decision making in psychiatry and addiction.  Patients without addictions are often told that they have choices.  That is a gross oversimplification when it comes to how people with mental illness make decisions.  The same thing is true of addiction.  The main difference is that a moralistic approach to addiction is still acceptable at many levels of society.  That is - if you correct your moral problem -  the addiction will be solved.  That is presently a lot harder to do with severe mental illness in most settings short of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity defense.  Even in the case of severe mental illness that clearly caused the crime, the the NGRI defense is usually not exculpatory.

Given those scenarios a philosophy for living can be considered a preventive measure rather than a primary cure.  As such it is outside the scope of psychiatry.  There have been a few psychiatrists who were philosophers, but the vast majority were not.  Over the years, I have found a first rate philosopher who I have followed on his blogs and in several of his books.  Massimo Pigliucci has written and edited several excellent books including Denying Evolution and Philosophy of Pseudoscience.  He also stopped writing what I consider to have been and outstanding blog about philosophy called Rationally Speaking that is still available to read.

For the purpose of this post he also writes the blog How To Be A Stoic. Most people have a truncated view of Stoicism.  It is really not like the stereotypical Norwegian bachelor farmers of the upper Midwest.  It is not the image that many of us got studying ancient governments and cultures.  It turns out that Stoicism is a philosophical approach to life.  That makes it unique in the field of philosophy, since most philosophies are not about how to live your life.  He recently offered to field some questions and answer them according to his interpretation of Stoicism.

It is against that backdrop that I sent Massimo the following question:


"I am currently an addiction psychiatrist and that means 100% of the people I see have one or more serious addictions.  While I operate from the neurobiological perspective with regard to addiction - phenotypic plasticity is operative.  I would estimate that 40% of the population is at risk for addiction if exposed to a matching intoxicant.  Availability of drugs as seen in the current opioid epidemic is always a significant factor.  

It is hard to ignore the cultural biases that lead to this exposure.  It seems to be part of the American culture that people expose themselves to drugs and alcohol at an early age.  In Middle School and High School as well as college there is peer pressure.  People who abstain from intoxicants are viewed as being square or possibly closet prohibitionists.  The former President of Mexico Vincente Fox suggested the entire reason for the War on Drugs was "America's insatiable appetite for drugs.."  I think that he was right.

I think that an important public health strategy would be to intervene at the "philosophy for living stage" that currently seems based on hedonism before the significant neurobiological effects from the intoxicants takes over. 

Is there any advice that Stoics may have to offer in this situation?  I guess I see the problem as a lack of a reasonable plan for living at the bare minimum when it comes to excessive drug and alcohol consumption.  

There is not much of a window between that and a full blown addiction."

And this is what he said.  Please read his well thought out post that contains some additional references.  His  discussion of the ancient version of the Serenity Prayer was very interesting.

Can Stoicism as a philosophy for living prevent addiction and a lot of other decisions that Americans make that are not in their best interest?  I agree with Massimo and think there are paths in addition to Stoicism.  The point of this post today is here is one example of what might be possible.  Here is an alternative to moral development that does not quite go the way it is taught in psychiatric texts.  Here is an alternative that offers more than a relatively bankrupt culture that emphasizes money, violence and hedonism.  Here is an alternative to prohibition.  After all if you are contemplative and are assessing your life on a daily basis relative to specific virtues - you will not need external controls.

Having a philosophy of life seems much better than not having one.


George Dawson, MD, DFAPA


Supplementary:  I wrote all of this post except for the book titles and the conclusory paragraph before reading Massimo's reply.  I did not want to be biased by his reply and try to seem more knowledgeable about Stoicism than I am.  A philosophy for living is definitely outside the expertise of most psychiatrists.


Attributions:

Photo at the top is  Agora of Smyrna, built during the Hellenistic era at the base of Pagos Hill and totally rebuilt under Marcus Aurelius after the destructive 178 AD earthquake, Izmir, Turkey from Wikimedia Commons By Carole Raddato from FRANKFURT, Germany [CC BY-SA 2.0 (htta significant hsitroical basis of Stop://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons.

Marcus Aurelius was a Roman emperor and also a practitioner of Stoicism.  His surviving writings provides a modern day resource of Stoicism.  From the number of quotations I think it is safe to say that modern day Stoics consider him to be a Stoic philosopher as well as practitioner.

The Moral Dilemma Of Alcohol Exposure

Before anyone schools me about Prohibition - I give lectures on Prohibition. I know it doesn't work and I know the reasons why. I also know that talking about restricting intoxicants in any way is counter to the current zeitgeist of liberalizing their availability.

I also treat alcoholics and I know how that works. When I see Minnesota's largest and most famous retailer opening up large and attractive liquor stores where there used to be not so attractive foods courts and positioning it right across from the cash registers - I know that will be a problem for a lot of people trying to stay sober. I know that for many people in recovery - an attractive liquor store in their favorite retail store or grocery store creates a very high probability of relapse - even if they know that relapse may result in death or severe disability. In Minnesota liquor stores hours is another issue. In states where liquor sales are prohibited like Minnesota, it is incentive to drive across the border into bordering states in order to buy alcohol. A modification is the availability of low alcohol content beer from grocery stores and gas stations.

Another proxy measure for relapse risk would be the total number of bars in each state.  That data is harder to get.  I have information from a tavern owner that the business organization representing them sets the maximum number at 1 tavern or bar per 500 people, but the actual limits are subject to local jurisdiction.  In reality the maximum tavern/bar concentrations occur in North Dakota, Montana, Wisconsin, and South Dakota ranging from 1621 - 2268 people per tavern/bar.  At the lower end Virginia ranks 50th at 64,773 people per tavern/bar. (US Census Bureau Data per The Forum).

Are retailers that desperate that they all need to compete in this low margin business? Why are governments in this business at all? I know that there are vocal people everywhere who argue for their unalienable right to intoxicants. One of the main arguments has always been that the vast majority of people can drink and not incur any problems from it. What about the people who cannot? Binge drinking, alcohol poisoning, and excessive alcohol use are all major public health problems according to the CDC. The direct and indirect cost of excessive drinking in the US is about $249 billion in direct and indirect costs.

One of the main arguments of cannabis advocates is how dangerous alcohol is. Alcohol costs $1.90 per drink according to the CDC in complications from drinking. That cost is probably artificially low because treatment and detoxification from alcohol is rationed and most people don't get anywhere near the level of treatment they need. In Twin Cities metro hospitals - drug and alcohol use can account for up to 60% of admissions. Potential consumer advocates in this case belong to an organization that values anonymity and as far as I know has not been very politically active.

The CDC (Community Preventive Services Task Force) suggests that alcohol excise taxes need to be increased, alcohol outlet density needs to be decreased, hours of sales need to be decreased rather than increased, and retailers need to be held liable for damages caused by underage or intoxicated drinkers. The tax suggestion reminds me of the general theory of sin taxes and why they really don't work from a governing standpoint. It basically generates money for politicians to spend and is typically diverted away from any stated use that involves treating complications of the activity.

To me the alcohol issue is much bigger than who sells it, but governments have a big problem at the moral and public health levels. Just carrying forward the CDC recommendations invites rhetorical response about prohibition or temperance. I have found myself in illogical arguments with both individuals and families about the right to drink oneself to death. Make no mistake about it, the issue was not suicide - just continuing to drink with advanced liver disease and repeated hospitalizations for bleeding problems and encephalopathy due to advancing liver disease and the associated anatomical and physiological changes.

At its base, the alcohol problems and tolerating excessive alcohol use is a cultural problem. In the Midwest where binge drinking is most prominent, teenagers start drinking in middle school. In many areas it is a rite of passage. Even though the majority of people don't drink. It is very difficult to find social settings that are alcohol free. Alcohol use in most settings is promoted as the social norm with the exception of a few subcultures. Barring a widespread cultural movement that promotes moderation or abstinence, it appears that the usual educational measures about the dangers of alcohol use will be the primary intervention point. Secondary and tertiary prevention depends on a robust system of care for alcohol use and that currently does not exist. In some cases close monitoring by the correctional system for people with DWI infractions can be effective, but that does not address either the group of people who do not come to legal attention or those for which legal intervention is not a deterrent.  It also does not provide long term solutions to the problem of continued alcohol use.

Despite all of the current hype about how some intoxicants are wonder drugs and the ongoing arguments about legalization of all or most intoxicants - I can't help but see this as another moral dilemma. The will of the many basically writing off the serious problems of the few. This often plays out in families where one member clearly has a severe drinking problem and the others (usually a spouse) refuses to not drink in front of them or not have alcohol available in the home.  It all comes down to the rationalization that everyone can control their drinking or that drinking can be seen as bad behavior and that is obviously not true.

The moral dilemma of increasing alcohol availability or the government sanctioned availability of any intoxicant is the same.  It is based on the theory that people in general can use these intoxicants without damaging other members of society or themselves to the point that they do not become a cost to the rest of society.  That essentially writes off the group of people with uncontrolled use who cannot do that.  American society traditionally handles that problem by punishment and rationing availability of treatment and detox services.  Functional detox services staffed by physicians are practically unheard of.  Contrary to that guy in your freshman philosophy course who doubted the meaning of everything - moral philosophers can also add a perspective here.  Consider this quote from Blackburn about the nature of moral knowledge:

"There are countless small unpretentious things that we know with perfect certainty.  Happiness is preferable to misery, and dignity is better than humiliation.  It is bad that people suffer and worse if a culture turns a blind eye to their suffering.  Death is worse than life; the attempt to find a common point of view is better than a manipulative contempt for it." (1).

The availability and treatment of alcohol related problems in American society on one hand and the motivation to profit from it on the other hand seems to stand Blackburn's quote on its ear.  In the US there is a clear blind eye approach to alcoholism.

It may be time to come up with a better plan for living.


George Dawson, MD, DFAPA


References:

1:  Simon Blackburn.  Being Good - A Short Introduction To Ethics.  Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK. p. 134.


Graphic:

Liquor store density is from Health Indicators Warehouse at www.healthindicators.gov and is in the public domain.  This graphic was generated on that site. (click to enlarge)

Reductionism Is Not A Dirty Word...

A recent opinion piece in the New York Times, by George Makari, MD has me shaking my head.  The thesis was that a recent headline grabbing story (what's wrong with that criteria?) on the effects of comprehensive treatment of psychosis as opposed to treatment as usual surprised many and highlighted the problem with reductionism.  He bemoans the fact that the reaction to the story was one of surprise.  He doesn't specify who was surprised.  I certainly was not surprised.  I attended recent meeting and somebody in the audience asked Daniel Weinberger if he was surprised.  His response: "They spent $15 million dollars showing that good treatment is better than bad treatment."    He certainly was not surprised.  I have not heard about Eric Kandel's response, but based on his 1979 paper on plasticity and what happens in psychotherapy - I doubt that he would be surprised.  The exact population of who might be surprised by these findings seems poorly defined at this point in time but I doubt that it included any psychiatrists.

Speaking for myself, I will elaborate on why I was not be surprised.  At one point, I was the Medical Director of a community support program of a group of about 100 outpatients in the State of Wisconsin.  According to the state statutes, access to the program depended on diagnosis and degree of psychiatric disability.  You could only apply if you had a diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder, Major Depression, Schizophrenia,  or Borderline Personality Disorder had significant associated disability or were at high risk for hospitalization.  The clinical goal of the program was to reduce hospitalizations, maintain independent living, and facilitate employment.  The program was staffed by a psychologist, 2 social workers, three nurses and me.  When I arrived, one of the early dynamics was to frame problems in terms of medication needs.  That translated to increasing the dose of a medication (typically an antidepressant or antipsychotic) in crisis situations or other emotional crises.  The patients in the program had chronic problems and symptoms that did not necessarily respond to medication.  One of my first steps was to start to discuss problems and solutions with the patients.  I met with all of the patients and did supportive psychotherapy when possible.  We had team meetings every morning and problem solved around the needs of the patients in the community, how to solve any crises, and how to approach people in ways other than medications.  I tracked the total dose of antipsychotic medication and days of hospitalization as outcome measures.  At the end of three years, the days in hospital had gone down from about 14 days per person to less than 1, and the total dose of antipsychotic medication had gone down a total of 600 mg chlorpromazine equivalents.

My point is obviously that comprehensive care of patients with severe problems results in improved outcomes.  In this case lower doses of medications were used and the patients spent less time in the hospital and more time at home.  My orientation and ability to implement such a program was not an accident.  I was trained by Len Stein, MD at the University of Wisconsin.  Dr. Stein was a pioneer in the area defined as community psychiatry.  He was motivated by realizing that once people were in large state hospitals - it was very easy to warehouse them in overcrowded conditions.  Nobody seems to recognize it but overcrowding and suboptimal conditions were the state hospital equivalent of managed care rationing.  Once your state hospital is on the spreadsheet of a state bean counter with no accountability to patients or their families rationing and fewer and fewer resources are the order of the day.   In a community psychiatry seminar, Dr. Stein projected a slide of a gymnasium-sized room populated by male patients with hundreds of cots aligned edge to edge.  There was no room to walk between the cots.  That was his motivation for moving people out of these state facilities and into their own housing.  When I trained, there were three programs with independent living and quality of life as the primary goals and the staff involved in the programs was very good at it.  My effort just extended that skill set.  Contrary to the "surprising" results of the quoted study - I did the same thing back in 1986!

If it is true that we have known for 30 years that comprehensive care for psychiatric disorders trumps "treatment as usual" what is all of the rhetoric about?  Dr. Makari seems to want to make this into a mind-brain argument.  In other words, the biopsychosocial approach and the uncertain effect it has on the mind as opposed to a brain based approach that looks at specific mechanisms of action and seems to be focused on psychopharmacology.  He points out for example that the highlighted study would possible not qualify for current NIMH funding unless it looked at specific brain mechanisms.  He throws around the word "reductionism".  Anytime reductionistic or reductionism is used rhetorically in the same sentence with psychiatry it is pejorative.  My old psychoanalytic teacher would refer to anyone who talked about brain biology as a "dial twister".  The implication is that the reductionists are somewhat simple minded largely because they cannot accept the uncertainty of dealing with an organ that has poorly defined inputs and outputs.  Kind of a double whammy of rhetoric - you are a unsophisticated reductionist and you really can't see the big picture.  Are things really that simple?  Are these arguments accurate?  Are there problems with equating reductionism with "bad".

Of course there are major problems.  The first is the statement that inherent to the proposition that mental illness is a brain disease is "the implication that psychological and social events somehow are not also brain events."  This is a serious misreading of the definition of plasticity or experience dependent changes in the brain.  When I give my neurobiology of the brain lectures. I use Kandel's original New England Journal of Medicine article that discusses brain changes in a patient and a therapist conducting psychotherapy and how those changes are associated with brain plasticity.  I give further examples - weightlifting,  playing the violin, and how the typical stream of consciousness is profoundly altered by drug addiction.  There is no neuroscientist or biological psychiatrist I know who would suggest that psychological and social events are not brain events and there are numerous experimental paradigms that look specifically at how these events occur in the brains of animals.

The second aspect of Dr. Makari's argument has to do with reductionism.  His specific comment is:

"With luck, studies like Dr. Kane’s, which undermine these suppositions, will help move us away from such narrow thinking and embolden the substantial community within psychiatry that has never accepted such reductionism."

The suppositions in this case are that mental illness is a brain disease and that social or psychological events have no brain representation.  The argument is based on that false premise.  But further the use of the term "reductionism" is instructive here as previously noted.  By definition reductionism applies to many proposed etiologies of psychiatric disorders.  Those etiologies can be studied at a molecular level or at a higher level.  Schaffer (2) says that a model is reductive if it "employs standard biochemical and molecular entities to account for psychiatric symptoms and disorders".  Non-reductive models discuss "causal connections at higher levels of aggregation."  He illustrates these definitions by looking at Kendler's non-reductive account of major depression.  Kendler has used path analysis to look at clinical variables relevant to psychiatric disorders and although I do not have access to the one used in the book, here is a typical example.  The model looks at life stages, familial factors and psychological factors and all are higher levels of aggregation than molecular mechanisms.  At the reductive side of things he examines Harrison and Weinberger's proposed genetic susceptibility genes for schizophrenia.  At the time the book was written the author limited the discussion to 5 genes.  He also looked at the continuum of psychiatric genetic models ranging from basic and advanced genetic epidemiology being non-reductive, gene finding partially reductive, and molecular genetics fully reductive.  It seems perfectly logical to me that the study of brain biology proceeds in the same way that the biology of all living organisms proceeds.  The difference is that we are studying an infinitely more plastic organ with significant computational power.  There is clearly a lot of phenotypic heterogeneity that is unexplained in psychiatric diagnostic categories.  It is highly unlikely that refining diagnostic descriptors or applying clinical methods will lead to any significant change in the diagnostic or treatment process.  I don't understand the reluctance to go after more specific mechanisms or treatments.

The idea that a molecular or clinical focus in psychiatry is the problem with psychiatric services is also misleading.  As I hoped to point out by my mental health center example, psychiatrists know all about comprehensive care but they are rarely able to provide it.  They have known about how to provide it for decades.  State asylums became overcrowded and not therapeutic due to the financial management of the system by state governments.  The bean counters have moved out of the asylum and they are now integrated at every level in the health care system.  They all have a very strong bias against the comprehensive treatment of mental illness.  They insist that patients with severe psychiatric problems do not get comprehensive evaluations, that they are discharged before they have been adequately treated, and that any associated addictions are poorly treated.  They do not have the same biases against people hospitalized for medical or surgical illnesses.  They have in effect, moved the poorly run, overcrowded asylum model into the general health care system.  Any comprehensive care for severe mental disorders in such a system is an advertising phenomenon rather than reality.

The reductionism argument is good for New York Times opinion pieces.  It may sell a few more papers or get a few more clicks online.  Unfortunately it perpetuates an old pattern of blaming people and psychiatrists in particular for the shortcomings of a non-system of mental health care in this country that is set up to favor large health care businesses.  You can blame psychiatrists all you want for that - but until people realize that the real problems are the product of business and politics - and not the scientific interests of psychiatrists - nothing will change.


George Dawson, MD, DFAPA

References:

1.   George Makari.  Psychiatry’s Mind-Brain Problem.  New York Times.  November 11, 2015.

2.  Scaffner KF.  Etiological Models in Psychiatry - Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches in  Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry.  Kenneth Kendler, Josef Parnas (Eds), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008:  pp 48-98.

Attribution:

Image is Microscope 1 by Bill3t Hughes on Flickr.  Reposted as noncommercial via Creative Commons License on 11/14/2015.  The original work is not modified.

What Have I Learned So Far?

I started writing this blog over three years ago.  I decided to start writing it for a number of reasons.  First and foremost was the constant stream of inappropriate criticism aimed at psychiatry that contrasted with my real life experience working in the field and working with very competent colleagues in the field.  The second reason was to strike back at managed care and its various forms that I would include today as pharmacy benefit managers, government bureaucracies and even politicians.  All of the individuals and organizations continue to promote and institutionalize rationing strategies that are supposed to be "cost effective" but basically route hundreds of billions of dollars away from patient care to unnecessary business managers.  The third reason is the disproportionate impact that the first two have on patient care.  The care of patients with psychiatric problems has been decimated by this mindset that is both hypercritical but ignorant of psychiatric care and at the same time rationing the resources to the point that incarcerations are commonplace.  Even if a person with a serious problem gains entry into a system of care, there is no guarantee that they will receive any - as administrators with no expertise at all make critical decisions about whether they are hospitalized, whether they get detoxification services, what medication they take, how intensively they are seen in clinics, and whether they get the additional supportive services that they need.  A related fourth issue is that even though systems of care define "dangerousness" as essentially the only reason people need to be hospitalized these days, they do a very poor job of assessing and treating it.  It needs to be addressed at a public health level as well and aggressive and homicidal behavior associated with mental illness needs to be systematically addressed rather than being swept under the rug as "stigmatizing".  Teaching is something that I am good at and I take an informational rather than process based approach.  What I post here is more likely to be high in information content and unique rather than entertaining.  In that area, I have wide interests in the field and how they apply to patient care and theory.  I post some scientific articles and clinical strategies that I hope will be clinically useful by my colleagues and in many cases they have already been vetted by some of my fellow psychiatrists.  Human consciousness is a related issue that I think has essentially been ignored by modern psychiatry and some of what I post here are examples of consciousness and how it works - both my own and other peoples.  That is the basic matrix that I am working from.  Other points that I have observed and what might be useful information for other potential psychiatric bloggers follows:

1.  Nobody really cares about your blog:  Blogs are a dime a dozen and everyone writes one these days.  My initial goal was getting my viewpoint out if people are interested or not.  An additional corollary in psychiatry is that in order to maximize the readership, the odds are better if you are criticizing the field or provocative rather than debunking a lot of the unrealistic criticism.  I hope it is clear that I am writing no matter what and will keep doing that as long as I care about what happens to psychiatrists, physicians, and their patients and and I continue to know exactly what the problems are.  As far as I can tell - there is very little of that perspective available in the blogosphere, the press, or even the editorial section of professional specialty journals.

2.  Thirty years of practicing medicine saps your creativity:  Most physicians realize this, but I have not heard many actually come out and say it.  I was a fairly skilled writer at one point, at least according to my undergrad professors.  Tens of thousands of pages of medical documentation later, much of it meaningless bullet points added for administrative purposes that mind numbing exercise has taken its toll.  Most physicians consider writing to be a burden for that reason.  My prose has become obsessive at times and (thanks to the electronic health record) grammatically incorrect.  I have been fortunate to have a regular reader here send me corrections and ideas on how to improve and greatly appreciate that advice.  Medical schools select bright and creative people to become physicians.  When those same medical schools are unconcerned about a deterioration in the practice environment that stifles creativity and dumbs down medical practice they are doing a disservice to medical students who they select for those qualities.

3.  Ignoring the haters:  This has never been a really big problem of mine.  Once you discover that a substantial number of people dislike psychiatrists and their reasons are irrational, they are easy to ignore,  My only initial mistake here was allowing several of these posts onto my blog when I should have just rejected them all.  I have seen what happens to threads and blogs where this irrational corrosive opinion is allowed to persist under the guise of "freedom of speech" or "freedom to criticize".  Any collegial atmosphere that I have ever trained in allowed rational criticism delivered in a manner that was acceptable to everyone.  Any post sent in my direction that I don't think would fly in a meeting of physicians, will not see the light of day here.  A good example would be attempting to post that I am a "drug company whore."  That is inappropriate first and also wildly inaccurate.  Some of the most notorious critics clearly do not know what psychiatrists do and have glaring deficits in scholarship on the subject.  For those who are inclined to ethical arguments, I would argue that it is unethical to allow a serious discussion by trained medical experts to be disrupted by people who are basically there to be disruptive and have nothing else to offer.

4.  Ignoring the numbers:  It is always difficult to figure out what the Blogger statistics mean.  They vary by a factor of 10 on a day to day basis.  In some cases, I have gotten 900 page views in less than one minute and doubt those represent anything real.  In many cases, the referring URLs are clearly spam sites or originate in countries where the youth are encouraged to become hackers and steal money from foreigners.  There are the occasional referrals from sites that seem to be legitimate, like valid educational sites.  I don't get too excited about the statistics - aggregate or parsed.  Anybody reading this and having a sense of solidarity with my statements and goals whether they say so or not is good enough for me.

5.  Analyze the rhetoric:  One of the most consistent dynamics that can be observed is how the most criticized branch of medicine is handled with a total lack of accountability on the part of the critics.  They of course can say whatever they want to and often loudly proclaim this as their right.  There is an inevitable group of hero worshipers that back them up like they have some new insights.  In fact, they have a collection of vague and inaccurate observations that they cling to like they know something about medicine or science.  Some real experts uncritically lend credence to some of these off-the-wall ideas.  One of the leading authors in this area had his book endorsed by an editor who was herself very critical of psychiatry.  It doesn't seem much different than coalescing around the concepts of Intelligent Design.  No science or even rational analysis.  Only an understanding of rhetoric prevents one from falling into this trap.

6.  You can only save yourself and maybe your patient:  Much of the heat when it comes to psychiatric criticism flows from business and ethical problems with pharmaceutical companies and associated physician conflict of interest.  There are entire blogs where this seems to be the only topic of interest.  One of those blogs claimed that they were "keeping psychiatry honest."  The implied claim in these sites is that complete transparency of all drug trials and no contact between physicians and the industry will lead to a new idyllic state, where we will only have completely safe and effective drugs.  Maybe we will also be able to stop studying neuroscience and hearken back to the psychotherapies and psychosocial interventions of the 1970s.  Those ideas are so naive that I could barely stand to type them out.  That line of thinking completely ignores the corrupt elephant in the room (Congress) and the fact that the FDA is clearly politically influenced to the point that they can ignore the recommendations of their own scientific committees and put any drug on the market that they want.  It ignores that fact that American governments are pro-business to the detriment of the individual and that corporations readily accept the model of paying civil penalties as a reasonable risk for pushing the business envelope.  It also greatly ignores that fact that psychiatrists are really minor players in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry, but nobody in the press seems too worried about that.

7.  There appears to be little solidarity among physicians:  Physicians have been divided for decades now by splitting and political factors both between specialties but also within the same specialty.  I think that is part of what fuels the cultural norm of criticizing colleagues even though the vast majority do good work and have no apparent or appearance of ethical problems.  See my post on monolithic psychiatry rhetoric.  I think that the critical component of scholarship is also frequently ignored when some adopt the posture that any criticism is the equivalent of criticism from within the field.  To me that is a falsely modest position when you have been rounding with physicians who are clearly well read and have the associated clinical experience.  Medicine is not something that you can learn from reading snippets on the Internet.  I don't know if there is widespread knowledge that physicians are actively managed to maintain them in a fractioned state.  When productivity units were first introduced,  managers everywhere suggested it was because there was tremendous variation in productivity and some physicians were not pulling their weight.  After everyone was being measured and pilloried about their "production" every month, it was apparent that was a lie.  But what better way to foster an "every man/woman for themselves" attitude and destroy any semblance of professional solidarity?  Let me say this here for future reference, the "management" of physicians is really psychological warfare against physicians and the motivation for those strategies is varied but certainly not benign.

8.  An ethical climate is well ..... an ethical climate:  Part of the business of manufacturing news and headlines includes constructing an ethical climate and applying it to the people being criticized.  There are generally set-ups for provocative articles that seem scandalous.  In fact, most of the ethics is debatable and the debates are typically one-sided.  That is the best way to both win an argument and successfully smear an opponent.  There are many an ethical environments and straw men set up against psychiatrists.  If it is clear that a physician has broken the law or the medical practice rules in their own state that constitutes proof of wrongdoing.  I have lost count of the times I have referred people to the Medical Board when they were complaining about a physician.  That generally marks the end of the discussion.  Most seem to have the expectation that publicly shaming a physician through ridicule means something.  It doesn't mean anything to me.

9.  Physician professional organizations are weak and ineffective:  I am a 30 year member of the APA and AMA.  That does not prevent me from criticizing these organizations or recognizing their shortcomings.  Psychiatry organizations are no different than the AMA or other physician organizations.  They have been very ineffective in the area of mental health policy especially countering managed care tactics to ration and restrict care.  They no longer advocate for state of the art care.  As I recently critiqued their guideline, it was not clear that you had to be a trained psychiatrist to use it.  That said, they have supported a few good initiatives like banning the participation of psychiatrists in torture and the resumption of Clinical Guidelines.  I am committed to speak out against APA positions that I think are problematic like their support of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN) position on recertification, collaborative care, the use of rating scales to establish quality of care parameters, and their participation with managed care entities to establish guidelines or quality parameters.  The APA has to do far more in establishing criteria for inpatient care of psychiatric and addiction problems and be actively critical of proprietary guidelines that facilitate the rationing of care.  But the commonest distortion is that the APA or the AMA have some kind of power to influence the politicians and businesses that run medicine in this country.  Nothing is farther from the truth.

10.  Developments in the field are important:  The psychiatric literature is better than it has been at any point in my lifetime.  There is a lot more to it than clinical trials and the current state of clinical trials seems like a dead end to me due primarily to a lack of sophistication.  Certain buzzwords like evidence-based medicine, controlled clinical trials, and collaborative care have been coopted by non-physicians to the point that they are often meaningless.   I critiqued a massive Medicare guideline that included a 40 page description of the evidence necessary for basic documentation.  In addition to the literature, there are excellent educational conferences widely available across the country.  People often lose sight of the fact that life is not a clinical trial, the clinical method is faster and probably safer, and that clinical trials both real and proposed are not necessarily the best use to time and energy.

11.  Trying to be creative:  Creative commentary and creative writing is possible and it is part of the tradition of psychiatry.  I have added a few things along the way that illustrate important concepts in a non-technical way and I am trying to add more graphics.  Some of these pieces are also there to illustrate stream-of-consciousness concepts - either mine or somebody else's.

12.  Supporting other bloggers:  I am quite happy to support other psychiatrists who are bloggers and any bloggers who I consider to be useful sources of information.  The blogosphere is immense and I am sure I have missed some people.  I try to include them in the list of blogs I follow and consult that list regularly.  If you are a psychiatrist, I encourage you to start your own blog, find your voice and add it.   I am very familiar with the work of hundreds of psychiatrists in the Midwest and know that my opinion reflects the opinion of many of them.  If your experience is my experience, you know that psychiatrists deal with impossible problems with minimal resources, put up with some of the most obnoxious administrators and managed care bureaucrats and we still get good results for our patients. Add your voice to the realistic information about psychiatry on the Internet and I doubt that you will regret it.

13.  Staying non-commercial:  Bloggers are encouraged to add on commercials and in some cases make money by blogging.  That seems like a potential conflict-of-interest to me, especially if you are marketing additional products like books, CDs, and speaker fees that espouse your personal viewpoints.  That is good because it may allow an appreciation of what it is like to attract paying customers including what needs to be said and the manner in which it is said.  It can also be a laboratory for the forces similar to the corrupting influences in the business world that can affect the delivery of health care.  Either way that is an influence on a blog's content.  Many posters seem to view blogs as their own method of advertising and attempt to design posts that bring readers to their own sources of advertising.  I think it makes sense to avoid avoid that advertising like you can avoid talking with pharmaceutical company sales staff and carefully consider what you are reading on a blog that is trying to sell you other products.


Paying attention to all of these things and more will hopefully keep me on track and keep me posting what is really going on in psychiatry as well as information that is useful to psychiatrists, other physicians, trainees, and anyone really interested in some of these topics.  I am not enough of a megalomaniac to believe that I can change the trends I am attending to, but I will not let them slip by without some realistic commentary.

That's about all I can say.


George Dawson, MD, DFAPA