Euthanasia And Other Ethical Arguments Applied To Psychiatric Patients

An article entitled Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide of Patients With Psychiatric Disorders in the Netherlands 2011-2014 caught my eye in this month's JAMA Psychiatry (1).  It wasn't that long ago that I recall being in the midst of a rather intense argument in a staff meeting about euthanasia in the broadest of terms.  Like many heated political arguments (I consider a lot of what goes on under the heading of ethics to be little more than politics) this one degenerated to personal terms.  The pro-euthanasia proponent ended the argument with: "Well if I am dying of terminal cancer and I want to end it, there is no one who is going to tell me that I can't do it.  Not you or anyone else."  In the dead silence that followed nobody brought up the obvious point that is the state of affairs currently.  Euthanasia proponents have always made that argument when in fact what they really want is to recruit physicians to provide them with euthanasia.  That is hardly the same thing as actively stopping them.  I would make the secondary argument that nobody really needs to be actively recruited these days.  I can't remember the last legal battle about whether a physician providing hospice care ordered too many opioids and benzodiazepines for a suffering terminally ill patient.  If I had to guess, the last time I saw that question raised in a court in the Midwest was about 20 years ago.

The concept of euthanasia in patients with psychiatric disorders is an even more complicated process.  Psychiatric disorders per se are not terminal illnesses, there is no protracted phase of increasing suffering and futile live saving measures with a fairly predictable death.  Death primarily due to psychiatric disorders occurs as a result of suicide, risk taking, comorbid medical illnesses, and severe disruptions in self care and homeostasis due to acute disorders like catatonia.  These are all relatively acute processes.  That does not mean that there are no people with chronic mood disorders, personality disorders, and psychoses.  Is the suffering in these situations acute and severe enough that euthanasia should be considered and if so, do any standards apply?

The authors of the Dutch study set out to study the characteristics of psychiatric patients receiving euthanasia or assisted suicide (EAS) in Belgium and the Netherlands.  The case studies of 66 cases were reviewed in the database of the Dutch regional euthanasia review committees.  There were 46 women and 20 men.  A little over half (52%) had made previous suicide attempts.  80% had been hospitalized in psychiatric units.  Most of the patients were aged 50-70 but 1/3 were older than 70.  Most (36) had depression and 8 of those patients had psychotic features.  The patients were described as chronically symptomatic and 26 patients had electroconvulsive therapy (ECT).  Two had deep brain stimulation - one for obsessive compulsive disorder and one for depression.  There was significant medical comorbidity.  The authors comment that there was very little social history to the point that they could not reconstruct the persons current living situation from what was abstracted.  Some of the reports contained fairly subjective data - as an example: "The patient was an utterly lonely man whose life had been a failure."  There was extensive treatment but also treatment refusal in 56%.

Twenty-one patients had been refused EAS at some point and in 3 of these cases the original physician changed their mind and performed EAS.  In the other 18 patients, the physician performing the EAS was new to the patient.  In 14 of those cases that physician was affiliated with a mobile euthanasia practice called the End-of-Life Clinic.  In 27 cases a psychiatrist did EAS and the rest were general practitioners.  Physicians disagreed in about 24% of the cases and EAS proceeded despite the disagreement.  In 8 cases the psychiatric consultant did not think that due care criteria specifying "no reasonable alternative" had been met.  The Euthanasia Review Committee (ERC) found that due care criteria were met in all psychiatric cases referred except for one.  In another case the ERC was described as being critical but in the end agreed with the euthanasia decision. It was a case of a man who broke his leg in a suicide attempt and then refused all treatment and requested EAS.

The authors come to several conclusions.  The first involves the issue that in this study the ratio of women to men was 2.3 to 1 and that is the opposite of what is expected with suicide.  They suggest that the availability of EAS may make the desire to die "more effective" for women.  Although the overall psychiatric sample was younger than the non-psychiatric EAS cases, they argue that the fact that a significant portion have significant comorbidities and this may indicate that Dutch physicians tend to self regulate EAS to a specific patient profile.  They point out that more judgment is required in psychiatric cases than in the cases involving terminal physical illness - 83% of which involved a malignancy.  They note that decision-making capacity can be affected by neuropsychiatric illness and that medical futility is difficult to determine especially when care is refused.  There were no official EAS psychiatric consultants involved in 41% of the cases.  In 11% of cases there was no psychiatric involvement at all.  Their overarching observation was that EAS for psychiatric illnesses involved making decisions about complex disorders and considerable judgment needed to be exercised.  They suggested that the decision about EAS required "considerable physician judgment" and that regional committees overseeing euthanasia deferred to the opinion of the treating physician when consultants disagreed.  

I have never seen it discussed but conflict of interest issues are prominent in any decisions about the autonomy of people who are designated psychiatric patients.  At the first level, there is the wording of the policy or statute.  There are criteria that are thought to be very objective that are used to decide if a person should be subject to civil commitment, guardianship, conservatorship, or any of the laws involving competency to proceed to trial, cooperate with one's defense attorney, or a mental illness or defect defense.  In all cases, the wording of each state's statute would seem to determine an obvious standard.  Those standards are routinely compromised in practice by any number of political considerations.  In the case of not guilty by reason of mental illness, the compromise occurs any time there are high profile cases that involve heinous crimes.  No matter how severe the mental illness, there will be a raft of experts on either side and the verdict will almost always be guilty.  At the other end of the spectrum is civil commitment.  Observing any commitment court over time will generally show the oscillation between libertarian approaches to more strict standards where need for psychiatric treatment is the more apparent standard.  The libertarian approach often uses a standard of "imminent dangerousness" as an excuse to dismiss the patient irrespective of what the statute may say.  It also seems to coincide with the available resources of the responsible county.   That is why in Minnesota the land of 10,000 lakes and 87 counties we say: "On any given day there are 87 interpretations of the civil commitment law."  Despite that range of interpretations, it would be highly unlikely that a patient who broke his leg in a suicide attempt (a case presented in this paper) would not be a candidate for court ordered treatment rather than euthanasia.  On the other hand, I do not know anything about civil commitment and forced treatment in the Netherlands.

There is no reason I can think of that a euthanasia standard can be interpreted any more logically. This Dutch study points to that.  It also points to another issue that is never really discussed when it comes to psychiatric diagnosis or the ethics and laws that apply to them.  The conscious state of the individual is never recognized.  Brain function is parsed very crudely into separate domains of symptoms, cognitions, and decisions.  The examiner or legal representative usually has some protocol by which they declare the person competent or not and the legal or ethical consequences proceed from that.  There may be a discussion of personality that is also based on this parsing process.  Very occasionally there is a discussion of the person's baseline, but that is about it.  That is a serious problem for any student of human consciousness.  Let me explain why.  I think that it is a universal human experience to experience a transient (days to months) change in your conscious state that might result in you not wanting to live.  The insult could be a physical or mental illness.  It would seem to me that at a minimum there can be multiple conscious states operating here that look like a request for assisted suicide or euthanasia.  The limits would be bounded by a completely rational decision based on medical futility and suffering on one side and an irrational decision based on the altered conscious state on the other.  The only way for any examiner to make that kind of determination is to know the patient very well over time to recognize at the very least that they are not themselves.  Doing an examination for the express purpose of determining if a person meets criteria for euthanasia in a short period of time is by contrast a very crude process.        

There is too much variability in the patient's conscious state and how that impacts treatment and ultimately recovery to consider psychiatric disorders as a basis for a decision about euthanasia and assisted suicide.


George Dawson, MD, DFAPA


References:

1:  Kim SH, De Vries RG, Peteet JR. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide of Patients With Psychiatric Disorders in the Netherlands 2011 to 2014. JAMA Psychiatry.2016;73(4):362-368. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2015.2887.

2:  Appelbaum PS. Physician-Assisted Death for Patients With Mental Disorders—Reasons for Concern. JAMA Psychiatry. 2016;73(4):325-326. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2015.2890.


Supplementary 1:  I intentionally wrote the above post without reading the accompanying commentary by Paul S. Appelbaum, MD.  Dr. Appelbaum is an expert in forensic psychiatry and has written extensively on ethical issues in psychiatry.  Dr. Appelbaum's essay provides some additional facts, but his areas of  concern do not touch on my focus on the conscious state of the individual.

Psychiatry With And Without A Conscious State

One of the great attractions of psychiatry for me - is the skill set that you have to develop to understand a person's real problems.  By real problems - I mean the problem or problems that brought them in to see you in the first place.  I am not talking about the problem listed on a referral sheet, or spoken in a telephone call, or even described to you by another physician or family member.  Advocacy groups and some psychiatrists tend to be self congratulatory on the amount of information about psychiatric disorders that is out there.  There is an excessive amount of confidence in lists of symptoms being the same thing as a diagnosis.  Any psychiatrist will tell you that the number of people who walk into the office and proclaim they have depression, bipolar disorder, or attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder is at an all time high.  They typically come to that conclusion by some combination of listening to TV ads or friends and family members.  In some cases they are directed to Internet sites where they can take a brief quiz to determine the diagnosis.  In almost all cases they are wrong.  Interviewing people to come up with both diagnoses and diagnostic formulations - is a considerable skill set that cannot be replicated by handing that person a symptom checklist or interviewing them like a talking checklist.

The problem in cases of self-diagnosis is that most people have a limited awareness of what diagnosable mental illness is.  They get their ideas from a static checklist or advice from a person who has not seen hundreds of people with the condition.  That process is often a checklist by proxy as in "I read this checklist in a magazine and you seem to have the symptoms.  You must have bipolar disorder."  In many ways that is like reading a manual about how to repair a complicated problem with your car.  Some untrained people may be able to pull that off, but the vast majority will fail.  The failure will occur at the level of pattern matching with the severe problems as well as the appropriate assessment of biases along the way.  That is not to say that experts are free of bias, but they are less susceptible to the common biases that occur along the way largely due to an accumulation of patterns that they have encountered over the course of their careers.

To develop the best possible understanding of psychiatric diagnosis and how it works might require consideration of some overlapping models of the conscious state in humans.  Consciousness is a complicated process concept, but it basically refers to the collection of mental processes that result in a stable personality and behavior over time.  An example of elements of consciousness is included in the representation below.  It contains descriptions that are found in the writings of David Chalmers and other authors on consciousness.  Chalmers breaks consciousness down into the easy problems or readily observable properties of consciousness and the hard problem.  The hard problem involves figuring out how the neurobiological substrate can generate conscious states and how those states are all unique.  There are a lot of theories about how that might happen, but none of them have been proven.

 The psychiatric assessment is trying to determine the parameters listed in the box at the right.  Some of the properties of consciousness are listed in the box at the left.  There is not a clear correlation between these elements, but what needs to be elicited in the interview will be determined to a large extent by the conscious state of the individual.  As an example, if I am interested in asking about sleep, I routinely take a sleep history that goes back to childhood.  I ask about insomnia, nightmares, night terrors, sleepwalking, and all of those states over the decades that gets me to the current age of my patient.  As an adult I ask about whether or not they have had polysomnography, whether they snore or have restless legs at night.  I ask them about the medical and non-medical treatment they have received for insomnia and if there were any complications.  I have to observe whether or not the person can reasonably respond to those questions or not and a lot of that depends on their conscious state.

In order to make a psychiatric diagnosis of a basic mood disorder, the primary criteria is that there has been a phasic mood disturbance for a certain duration.  In the case of depression the primary DSM-5 criteria is:  "Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by subjective report or observation made by others" or  "Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all activities, most of the day, nearly every day."  That basic distinction taxes the conscious state of many people who are already diagnosed with mania or depression.  Wait a minute - "most of the day, nearly every day" - don't I have good days and bad days."  The number of people who make that observation when they are asked the specific question is significant.  When I hear that response, I remember the pre-DSM Feighner criteria for intermittent depression.  In those days it was acceptable to have good days and bad days.  Today in a complicated process occurring in the person's conscious state they need to decide if this phasic mood disturbance really applies or if there are other reasons for endorsing a positive response.  If they are handed a standard checklist for depression like the PHQ-9, the conscious thought process is much different than a psychiatrist asking them about an all encompassing mood disorder rather than "good days or bad days."

The process might even have to take a step farther back when the patient states:  "Wait a minute doc, I am not sure that I know what anxiety or depression really is.  Aren't they the same thing?  Doesn't one turn into the other? Can you explain it to me?"  This is a much different interview than a person coming in and declaring a problem.  This person is aware that some kind of problem exists.  They may have learned that from feedback from a spouse or an employer.  They don't know what to call it.  They might be aware of physical distress, but be unable to make the connection to emotional perturbations.  Is their concept of a disorder the same as the person who comes in declaring themselves to have the problem.  Probably not, but it is apparent to me from interviewing tens of  thousands of people over the past thirty years that everyone has a slightly different idea of the problem.  It is obvious that it is also a much different situation when the patient is handed a checklist of symptoms of depression and makes what is essentially a series of forced decisions about if they have depression and how severe it is.   Consciousness researchers have used the thought experiment about the color red for years.  That is, my experience of the color red, is probably different from your experience of the color red.  In other words, my conscious state processes the color red in a different and unique way compared with your conscious state.  Why would that not be true with regard to the various types of depression and anxiety?

 That brings me to another conceptualization that is often used to look at diagnoses like the dementias, schizophrenia, and attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder.  The abilities to plan, act, and perform these acts successfully is often referred to as executive function.  Although these functions tend to be arbitrary and arrived at by consensus, they have always been important in psychiatric diagnoses.   Major mood disorders, schizophrenia, and neurocognitive disorders may all have varying degrees of impairment in executive function.  Testing specific functions and trying to correlate them with behavior at the clinical level is frequently disappointing except in cases of significant brain damage.  By inspection, it is apparent that there is an overlap between executive functions and consciousness - but not a complete mapping by any means.  DSM-5 has a fairly extensive table on six Neurocognitive Domains (pages 593-595) that describes executive function as one of these domains.  Executive function is defined as planning, decision-making, working memory, inhibition, mental flexibility, and responding to feedback.  Clear examples of what can be observed in each case are given.  Neurocognitive disorders are clear problems in consciousness.

The common psychiatric approach to diagnosis and treatment is what I would call a biomedical approach.  It was elaborated on by George Engel in his famous paper on the biopsychosocial approach to medicine, but it was practiced extensively before that paper was written.  A lot of the social and familial aspects of this interview were undoubtedly influenced more by epidemiology and genetics rather than consciousness factors.  It has been known for some time that you make be more likely to have a heritable illness if it runs in your family or it occurs in members of your occupation.  But what does a psychiatrist also need to know about how anxiety develops.  Can it be transmitted directly from a parent who is a "worry wart" to a child?  Does the child recognize it at the time?  Do children remember when their father was enraged or their parents were fighting and they were wide awake listening to it all night long?  Do people remember what it was like to "walk on eggshells" due to all of this adversity occurring during their childhood?  Do all of these incidents affect elements of their conscious state that keep them stuck in what are defined as psychiatric disorders?  Without a doubt.

 Conscious states are important in both the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric disorders, but for the purpose of this post I am ending on diagnostic considerations as noted in the first slide of this series.  I will briefly comment on the importance of each dimension.


Interview Context:  Psychiatrists are called on to provide services in a wide variety of environments.  The appropriateness of the environment for both assessment and treatment needs to be assured.  It is common for a third party to want to restrict access to the time of psychiatrists by rationing their time with the patient or total time allowed to see each patients.  Times vary greatly from system to system.  In some cases, a the time allocated for a new evaluation is 30 minutes and in others it can be up to 90 minutes.  I have completed complete interviews at both ends of the spectrum, but the limiting factor can never be some preconceived notion by an administrator.  The patient's conscious state is the limiting factor.  That includes how they respond to the psychiatrist and the introductory process of the interview.  It also depends on a quiet confidential environment and whether there are any observers in the room.  I have had many colleagues tell me that their interaction with patients is definitely affected both other people in the room.  This is a factor that can affect both the conscious state of the psychiatrist and the person being interviewed.

Empathy:  All psychiatric trainees learn a lot about empathy in early interviewing courses.  The necessary prelude to empathy is therapeutic neutrality.  That is a confusing term to nonpsychiatrists, but it essentially means not bringing in any extraneous interpersonal factors or emotions into the interview of a specific patient.  That ability is gained by self-analysis, experience, and in some cases personal psychoanalysis.  From the patient perspective, emotional reactions often surface as part of longstanding patterns of behavior.  They are often proximate to the problem at hand and very relevant in the initial interview situation.    

Empathy is taught as essentially a cognitive appreciation of the patient's emotional state.  The single best definition of empathy is from Sims in his book on descriptive psychopathology.   “In descriptive psychopathology the concept of empathy is a clinical instrument that needs to be used with skill to measure the other person’s internal subjective state using the observer’s own capacity for emotional and cognitive experience as a yardstick. Empathy is achieved by precise, insightful, persistent and knowledgeable questioning until the doctor is able to give an account of the patient’s subjective experience that the patient recognizes as his own.”  Sims captures the dynamic basis of the interview in this definition.  An empathic interview should result in a patient feeling very understood by the end.

Intellectual Capacity:  The intellectual capacity of the patient may vary considerably based on the psychiatric disorder they are experiencing.  By intellectual capacity, I am not referring to IQ scores.  I am referring to the ability of both the patient and the psychiatrist to recall and process information and consider a maximum number of explanations for what the patient is going through.

Emotional Capacity:  In the dyadic interview, the emotional capacity of both the psychiatrist and patient are important.  Can the patient describe the extent of any emotional disruption and the time course of that process.  Are they psychologically minded or can they appreciate social or psychological etiologies for these symptoms or do they view the problems as being treated only with a medication.  Psychiatrists are to a large degree self-selected on the basis of their interest in emotional problems. Many psychiatrists have had first hand experience in families where members have had a mental illness or addiction.  They had experience with all of the difficulties of getting that family member adequate treatment.  They recognize that these problems are very real and are generally highly motivated to provide treatment and advocacy.  As previously noted in the discussion of empathy, the ability to experience the emotional states of patients and describe them is necessary.  Sampling one's emotional state during the interview can also provide insights about the interview process, diagnosis, and overall meaning of the information being discussed.  As the average age of psychiatrists has increased, they have also seen thousands of patients with different kinds of emotional problems and successfully treated them.    

Information Content:  I find it surprising that the information content of diagnostic interviews is never estimated and the importance is never really taught.  There may be a correlation with the length of the interview, but not necessarily.  I can interview a person who gives brief high information content responses and do a reasonably good assessment in 30 to 45 minutes.  I can talk with a person who digresses and gives a lot of irrelevant details and still not have what I need at the end of 90 minutes or an hour.  The person who can assist me in doing the brief interview is not as common in my experience and I would say they represent 5% or 10% of the people I have seen.  There are also the Augenblick diagnoses or ones that can be made in the blink of an eye.  If I see a person with catatonia, delirium, or a stroke - I may not have to have them say anything to me.  Those rapid diagnoses will precipitate a thought process about what else needs to be ruled out and what tests need to be done immediately to confirm the diagnosis.  The information content in an interview is bidirectional and probably encompases severe channels including speech and paralinguistic communication.  The paralinguistic channel also contains information about the affiliative behavior of the participants.

Therapeutic Alliance:  An optimal diagnostic and treatment relationship flows from therapeutic alliance between psychiatrist and patient.  In other words - both are working together on a problem or set of problems that is bothering the patient.  It proceeds lie all patients interactions in medicine on an informed consent model.  Acute care psychiatry often involves the assessment and treatment of patients who are being detained on an involuntary basis because of safety concerns and in that situation the psychiatrist can be perceived as an agent of the state.  In that case and in many cases of long term treatment, it is often a good idea to review this principle with people in treatment to reorient them to the process.  Even a person who is being briefly seen for medication can have a problem in treatment if they perceive a psychiatrist a being poised over a prescription pad, ready to address their briefly stated problems with a new prescription.

Structure:  The psychiatrist has a responsibility to structure the interview so that the time is ultimately used to get results for the patient.  That means a singular focus on the patient, how the patient is proceeding in the interview, and how they are presenting the information.  That can mean giving additional information about the interview to the patient, providing necessary definitions, and doing whatever can be done to enhance the information content of the interview.  The introduction to the patient is critical because to this day there is still confusion over the definition of psychiatry.  I generally tell everyone my name, my years of experience, and present them with my business card.  After that I clear up any questions about psychiatry.  Some people ask about where I trained and I provide them with that information.  Some ask for clarification about the interview as we proceed.  A common question is: "Do you want the long version or the shirt version?"  Some early questions are also red flags and may be an indication of strong biases by the person being interviewed that may even preclude the interview itself.  Some of those decisions may also depend on the interview setting.  An example might be religion as a selection factor.  If a person tells me that they can only talk to a Christian using their specific definition and they want to ask me questions to determine my status, it might be easy to suggest that they see someone else in an outpatient setting, but a lot more difficult if you are the only available psychiatrist on an inpatient unit.

Technical Skill:  Like most professions, there is some variation in the interview and interpersonal skills of psychiatrists.  A psychiatric interview requires technical skills that psychiatrists have been focused on since early in their training.  Those skills are the focus of courses, seminars, books, papers and direct observation by training supervisors.  Since the oral board examinations have stopped, psychiatric residents now do the equivalent of oral board examinations on interview techniques during their training.  During an interview, a psychiatrist is listening for patterns and inconsistencies.  A psychiatric interview is not an interrogation.  In an interrogation, the interviewer generally has a bias and asks very leading questions to confirm that bias.  That style is evident in any number of police and crime television shows and films that are easily accessed these days.  In a psychiatric interview, the psychiatrist is developing hypotheses about diagnoses and formulations and inconsistencies with those hypotheses.  The interview itself can be very nonlinear and the psychiatric directs the interview from one major cluster of information to another.  A parallel process during the interview is recognizing the person's mental state and its potential origins.  Empathy as noted above is a critical aspect of that process.

Psychiatry is currently being practiced with an implicit rather than explicit focus on consciousness.  Making consciousness more explicit adds a lot to assessment and treatment.  The idea that every new patient being seen is truly a unique individual based on their conscious state is a primary organizing factor.  Their experience of mental distress is unique and can only be categorized with the broadest categories.  That emphasis creates a high bar for anyone who wants to be a good psychiatrist.  That psychiatrist by definition will critique each interview while they are documenting it and consider what was missed.  That psychiatrist will also critique any practice setting that requires them to interview patients according to electronic health record forms, diagnose people based on rating scales, or respond to patients in a stereotypical manner.  The recent emphasis on collaborative care is also a dead end in terms of consciousness.  The idea that a psychiatrist looking at rating scales and "managing populations" without ever talking to any of those patients is absurd from the standpoint of conscious states and diagnostic precision.

Human consciousness doesn't work that way and psychiatrists can't either.




George Dawson, MD, DLFAPA

How To Ruin Your Life Without Being Dangerous

Changes in Personality and Decision-Making

The above table is really all that you need to know. You don't need to know anything about psychiatric diagnoses. You don't need to know anything about medications. That is typically how the problem is approached these days. What could have gone wrong? What kind of mental illness could account for what happened to this person? Let's get a panel of experts together, put them all on TV and have them speculate about what type of mental illness the person might have. I have never observed this to be a useful exercise. How could it be? There are just too many conflicts of interest and too much entertainment bias for anything of value to occur. The diagram is meant to illustrate the basic transitions associated with many mental illnesses and how the problems occur. It appears to be very simple and it is even more simple than depicted.

The top two zones - both Dangerousness and Altered State of Consciousness can be combined because Dangerousness has no medical or psychiatric meaning.  It is a legal and/or managed care definition.  From the legal side of things it determines grounds for civil commitment, guardianships and conservatorships. More importantly it determines when courts can dismiss these cases and not spend money on the people brought to their attention.  In the case of managed care companies, they view dangerousness as the only reason that somebody needs to be in a psychiatric hospital.  The diagram illustrates why they are wrong.  Rather than considering this process to be tabular a Venn diagram might be a better way to view things.  I constructed this one looking at some relative contributions of these conscious states.  Keep in mind that the dangerous conscious state here is an artificial legal and insurance company construct and that all of the demarcations here are permeable to indicate that transitions between states commonly occur.  A porous line might be better but I am limited by my software.  The diagram also illustrates that in these transition zones the difference between an altered and even dangerous state may be practically indistinguishable from the baseline state.

The simple 3 row table also describes what families have observed happening since ancient times.  It has only recently been modified to include the role of physicians, medications, insurance companies and local governments.   What do I mean about family observations?  Within the timeline of any family, the generations observe their members starting out as a vigorous young people and going through the expected developmental stages of adulthood.  The trajectory is predictable with some notable exceptions.  Some family members will get sick and die unexpectedly.  Some may get sick or injured and become disabled.  That is as true today as it was a hundred years ago.  It is also the case that the disabilities can be mental problems as well as physical health problems.  They can be something that you are born with or something that you acquire along the way.  Most families have stories about members who experienced some kind of transitional event and they were never the same afterwards.  That transitional event could have been a serious illness, an accident,  an episode of psychological trauma, exposure to combat,  excessive exposure to street drugs or alcohol, changes in interpersonal relationships, or losses of significant people in their life.  There is a consensus in the family.  They all see the person as changed.  That change is sometimes positive, but typically the person seems less well and less capable of handling life's everyday stressors.  The diagram attempts to illustrate what families observe in terms of personality characteristics and decision-making.

In the diagram, the diagnosis is really not the most important consideration.  All diagnoses and all problems for that matter are mediated by a conscious state.  All human beings have a unique conscious state that starts in the morning when we wake up and our feet hit the floor.  We have a stream of ideas and thoughts that occur in familiar ways every day and our behavior patterns and personalities are fairly predictable to our friends and family.   There are very limited discussions of conscious state in any discussion about psychiatric diagnosis or the ways that diagnosis impacts on a person's ability to function.  A further complicating factor is that most of the considerations about problems functioning suggest that there is a linear relationship between the mental illness and the inability to function.  For example, in the case of schizophrenia the diagnostic criteria may be met, but at some point a determination of the person's insight and judgment is made.  Problematic behavior is often taken as proof of a lack of insight.  Anosognosia or a form of neglect has been cited as one of the reasons for impaired insight in schizophrenia.  The actual sequence of events looks something like this:

Baseline -> Symptoms of schizophrenia ->  Diagnosis of schizophrenia ->  Problematic behavior

The real sequence of what happens is far from that linear.  Problems are often noted over a number of years.  Drug use and other behavior problems are often theories that families have before there are more clear cut symptoms allowing the diagnosis.  The concepts of pre-clinical, sub-clinical, and latent syndromes are described by some researchers.  But the main point I am trying to make here is that the pathway is not linear and there are associated changes in the person's conscious state.  There is rarely a sequential pathway to a significant mental illness.  There are starts and stops and often misdiagnosis along the way.  People can pass back and forth between an altered state of consciousness and their baseline mental status for a long time before any psychiatric diagnosis is declared.  

Psychotic depression is often a difficult illness to diagnose and treat.  Consider another common scenario.  An elderly woman walks into her kitchen and discovers her husband pointing a shotgun at himself.   She convinces him to put the gun down and go to see their doctor.  She is completely shocked about the suicidal behavior and did not see it coming.  They have been married for 40 years.   Her husband had no prior history of suicidal behavior or depression.  As they talk with his primary care physician, she corroborates that he seemed to have been sleeping well, but seemed less spontaneous and "happy".  She was shocked to find out that he had lost about 15 pounds.  He is sent to a local hospital where he talks with a psychiatrist and at one point says: "I just could not go on living anymore."  Further questioning leads to a discussion of an event that occurred when he was in high school (over 65 years ago) that he was guilty and embarrassed about.  His worries about the event continued to build until he got to the point that he saw suicide as his only means of relief.  He was too embarrassed to discuss it with his wife.  He had the original suicidal thought over 6 months ago and he observed it "come and go" over time.   This is a good illustration of how delusional guilt can be associated with transitions between baseline and then within the altered states model to one that is potentially dangerous.  It also illustrates how the individual life experience of the person is relevant. 

Manic and hypomanic patients often have transitions in their mood state.  Families members will call and say that the person needs to be in the hospital because they are keeping the whole family up all night and there have been some dangerous confrontations as a result of the sleep deprivation.  The patient can present very calmly and declare that the only problem is their family.  They may not acknowledge that they are spending money excessively, driving recklessly and starting to drink a lot.  Since they do not believe that there are any problems they will refuse crisis care, sleep hygiene advice or medication changes.  They are incapable of recognizing a change in their conscious state that puts their marriage, finances, and health at risk.  With many people this can be a self limited change, but in others it can lead to mania and psychosis or severe depression.  At the critical point where the altered conscious state could be treated, they are unable to process that information and make a decision in their best interest.  They may come back later and tell the psychiatrist who was trying to make an acute assessment that they were really out of it at the time but during the acute episode they were not able to see this reality.

Altered conscious states also occur in outpatient settings.  It is not uncommon to talk with professionals who need a specific medication that is prohibited by their licensing or regulatory body.  These are typically professions that regulators decide can inflict a significant amount of damage if they are compromised in some way by prescription or illicit drugs.  In the case of a person concerned about losing that profession, not reporting the medication or not taking it can happen.  That can occur as both a direct attempt to mislead regulators or as a result of impaired decision making from a substance use or mental disorder.

From what I have seen about the way that mental illness and substance use can alter conscious states, figuring out how to recover baseline conscious state is far from clear.  The first issue is that there is no real focus on the problem.  Psychiatric hospitalizations depend on a handful of yes-no questions about suicide and in some cases homicide.  I was recently told that a psychiatric hospital said that their admission criteria was: "You have to be suicidal and we have to be able to discharge you in less than a week."  That statement is so far from the reality of how mental disorders need to be treated it is stunning.  That statement shows a lack of regard for quality assessment and treatment.   There is no apparent interest in restoring a person to their baseline or even finding out what that baseline was.  On the other hand, I have had active discussions with psychiatrists who were interested and actively talked about these things to their patients each day.  If you are such a psychiatrist, patients will often say that in retrospect their very interested and compulsive psychiatrist missed the fact that they had significant suicidal thinking or that their were probably psychotic in a previous interview.  

The life ruining events discussed in this post and the possible mechanism illustrate that our lives are a complicated web of social interaction.  We make decisions based on that web every day and all day long.  Going into a hospital and being discharged based on whether or not the suicide question is endorsed or whether or not you are aggressive is a very low standard of social behavior and ability to function.  It takes a lot more than that to stay married, stay on the job and perform it safely, stay in the role of spouse and parent, and stay in a stable living situation.  Those are the real goals of assessment and treatment when it comes to recovery rather than ruin. The necessary decision making is linked to a conscious state that may be in a state of flux during an acute episode mental illness.

It is important to recover and recover completely.  Being familiar with baseline conscious state rather than a list of symptoms as being a good measure for this seems like a reasonable approach.  


George Dawson, MD, DFAPA